A VIETNAM BALANCE SHEET

October 19, 1967 35¢

LOUISE DAY HICKS GETS OUT THE VOTE

THE REPORTER

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mijnheer Minuit had to rely on his business instincts alone but you don't.

The things Western Electric makes for the Bell telephone companies help you keep in touch with clients everywhere. They even let your computers keep in touch with their computers.

More and more business is being done that way.

So Western Electric is making more and more phones for computers to use.

They're called Data-Phone* data sets. We make them for the Bell telephone companies because it's our Bell System job to help you communicate.

Whether you're a real estate agent, or an Indian chief. Or a computer.

Western Electric
MANUFACTURING & SUPPLY UNIT OF THE BELL SYSTEM

*SERVICE MARK OF AT&T CO.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB members continuously have a wide choice of useful and valuable Book-Dividends like these

As a demonstration...you may have all of these FIVE INDISPENSABLE COOKBOOKS at once in a short experimental membership FOR ONLY $2 A VOLUME [RETAIL PRICES TOTAL $59.40]

THE SUGGESTED TRIAL: You simply agree to buy three additional Club choices within twelve months

America's most popular cookbooks... each the best of its kind

THE NEW YORK TIMES COOK BOOK *Edited by* CRAIG CLAIBORNE. More than **1400 recipes.** "One of the best basic cookbooks." —*Saturday Evening Post*
RETAIL PRICE: **$9.95**

JOY OF COOKING *by* IRMA S. ROMBAUER & MARION R. BECKER. More than **4300 recipes.** Favored in over 7,000,000 American homes.
RETAIL PRICE: **$6.50**

MASTERING THE ART OF FRENCH COOKING *by* JULIA CHILD, SIMONE BECK & LOUISETTE BERTHOLLE. More than **1000 recipes.** A masterpiece.
RETAIL PRICE: **$10**

THE SPICE COOKBOOK *by* AVANELLE DAY & LILLIE STUCKEY. **1400 recipes** from appetizers to desserts. "For the best kind of American food, both plain and fancy." —*N.Y. Times*
RETAIL PRICE: **$12.95**

LAROUSSE GASTRONOMIQUE. The internationally famous bible of cooking. A prime reference book of chefs, gourmets and experts; the world authority containing **8500 recipes,** 1000 illustrations, many in full color. "The mightiest, farthest-ranging, most astonishing single cookbook in the history of eating." —*Life* RETAIL PRICE: **$20**

BOOK-DIVIDENDS: A library-building plan every reading family should know about

THE OBVIOUS PURPOSE of this suggested trial is to have you discover, by actual experience, the extraordinary opportunity you will have to acquire a well-rounded library of useful, beautiful books at little cost—through the Club's unique Book-Dividend system. If you continue after this trial, for every Club Selection or Alternate you buy you will receive a Book-Dividend Credit which, upon payment of a nominal sum, will entitle you to a fine library volume. Many volumes call for only one Credit, plus **$1.00 or $1.50**—somewhat more for an unusually expensive volume.

✶HOW CAN THIS BE DONE?

A portion of the amount members pay for the books they buy is accumulated and invested in entire editions of valuable books and sets through special contractual arrangements with the publishers in each case. These are the Club's Book-Dividends. Since this plan's inauguration, **$401,000,000 worth of books (retail value) has been received by Club members.**

✶GOOD SENSE

• There are three other benefits of membership. First, members have a wide choice among the best new books—at least 200 a year. Second, prices average 20% below retail prices. Finally, the Club's unique method of operation **insures you against missing new books you fully intend to read,** but so often fail to read through sheer overbusyness.

BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB, Inc.
345 Hudson Street, New York, N.Y. 10014 **A157-10-2**

Please enroll me as a member of the Book-of-the-Month Club and send me the five cookbooks shown here, billing me only $2 a volume. I agree to purchase at least three monthly Selections—or Alternates—during the first year I am a member. I have the right to cancel my membership any time after buying these three books. If I continue after the trial, I will earn a Book-Dividend Credit for every Selection—or Alternate—I buy under the system described at left. (A small charge is added to all shipments to cover postage and mailing expense.) **PLEASE NOTE:** Occasionally the Club offers two or more books at *a special combined price.* Such purchases are counted as a single book in fulfilling the membership obligation.

MR. / MRS. / MISS .....
(Please print plainly)

Address .....

City 7-71

Zone or Zip ..... *State* .....

The trademarks BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB *and* BOOK-DIVIDEND *are registered by Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., in the U.S. Patent Office and in Canada.*

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REMY MARTIN
V.S.O.P.
Take the guesswork out of choosing Cognac

REMY MARTIN
V.S.O.P.
Rely on French law: only the finest Cognac...

REMY MARTIN
V.S.O.P.
May be labeled Fine Champagne V.S.O.P.

REMY MARTIN
V.S.O.P.
Only Remy Martin produces Cognac of no lesser quality

REMY MARTIN
V.S.O.P.
Remy Martin...one quality, one bottle, world-wide

REMY MARTIN
V.S.O.P.
Take the guesswork out of choosing Cognac. Insist on...

REMY MARTIN
V.S.O.P.

80 PROOF • RENFIELD IMPORTERS, LTD., N.Y.

THE REPORTER

THE MAGAZINE OF FACTS AND IDEAS

MAX ASCOLI, *Editor and Publisher*

Executive Editor, Philip Horton *Managing Editor,* Donald A. Allan
Senior Editor, Derek Morgan *Washington Editor,* Meg Greenfield
Art Director, Reg Massie *Literary Editor,* Nora Magid
Associate Editor, Kenneth Goodall *Copy Editor,* Elizabeth Stille
Writers: Claire Sterling, Edmond Taylor, George Bailey, Denis Warner, Martin Nolan
Staff: Elizabeth Parsons (*Asst. to the Editor*), Louisa Messolonghites (*Asst. to Editors*), Ruth Ames (*Librarian*), John A. Anderson, Jr., Lee Culpepper, Elizabeth N. Layne
General Manager, John J. Borghi
Circulation Manager, George Hinckley *Director of Advertising,* Roger J. Lederer
Director of Promotion, Shirley Katzander *Production Manager,* Rudolph Ford
Controller, Anthony E. Lanza *Asst. Circ. Mgr.,* Natalie S. Garr
Published by The Reporter Magazine Company, Nathan W. Levin, President

VOLUME 37, NO. 6 **OCTOBER 19, 1967**

THE REPORTER'S NOTES 10

The Cost of Gradual War

A VIETNAM BALANCE SHEET . . . . . *Hanson W. Baldwin* 14

BEARING THE BRUNT AT CON THIEN . . . . . *Denis Warner* 18

At Home & Abroad

LOUISE DAY HICKS GETS OUT THE VOTE . . . . . *Martin Nolan* 22

CARTOON . . . . . *Fernando Krahn* 25

THE CASE FOR THE TAX SURCHARGE . . . . . *Herbert Stein* 26

THE STEADY DECLINE OF NEW DELHI'S AUTHORITY . . . . . *Sundar Rajan* 30

HOW WALLACE WILL RUN HIS THIRD-PARTY CAMPAIGN . . . *Richard M. Scammon* 34

Views & Reviews

EUCALYPTUS TREES (SHORT STORY) . . . . . *John McPhee* 36

DAMAGED IN TRANSIT FROM STAGE TO SCREEN . . . . . *Richard Bimonte* 39

POEMS . . . . . *Norman Jackson* 40 and 48

Books:

LOADED FOR BEAR . . . . . *Sarel Eimerl* 42

RHODESIA'S CASE . . . . . *Ernest W. Lefever* 45

LEEMANSHIP . . . . . *Roger D. Masters* 46

THE REPORTER, October 19, 1967, Volume 37, No. 6. Second-class postage paid at New York, New York, and at Dayton, Ohio. Published every other Thursday except for omission of two summer issues by The Reporter Magazine Company, 660 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10021. © 1967 by The Reporter Magazine Company. All rights reserved under Pan-American Copyright Convention. Subscription prices, United States and U. S. Possessions: One year $7, Two years $11, Three years $14. Additional postage for Canada and Pan-American Union, $.50 per year; all other countries, $1.00 per year. Please give four weeks' notice when changing address, giving old and new address. **Send notice of undelivered copies on Form 3579 to: The Reporter, Box 501, Des Moines, Iowa 50302.** *Indexed in Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and *Public Affairs Information Service.*

Manuscripts or artwork submitted to The Reporter should be accompanied by addressed envelope and return postage. The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited manuscripts or artwork.
Editorial and Business Office: 660 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10021; Phone: TEmpleton 2-8800.
Washington Office: 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006; (202) 298-8186.

PROPERTY OF THE HOOVER INSTITUTION
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Death of a traveling salesman

You've just landed in a city that gets only 7 inches of rain a year. All on the day you arrive.

You have a meeting at 659 Washington Street, which is right across from the Civil War Monument, and everybody knows where that is. Except you.

You're waiting in line to return the car you rented. So are a lot of other people. But they don't have to catch a plane in five minutes.

You've locked your suitcase and you've tried to pick the lock with a paper clip. Now where can you find a locksmith to remove the paper clip?

You've run out of money. Your shoeshine boy does not accept major credit cards.

A business trip is often one minor calamity after another.

Add them together and they produce a traveler who mostly wants to travel home.

But long before he sees home, he's likely to see a Hertz counter. And, as fellow humans, that gives us some obligation to do what we can for him.

And we can do more than rent a car.

For instance, if you don't know how to get where you're going, we'll give you a map and diagram the route.

If you run short of money, we'll lend you $10 cash. (Just show us your Hertz charge card and we'll tack the loan onto your rental.)

If you get caught in the rain without a raincoat, we'll give you a raincoat.

If you're a stranger in any of 33 cities, we'll give you a survival manual that tells where to find anything else you may need—from a decent hotel room to dental work at 2 a.m.

If you're in a hurry to return one of our cars, we won't make you stand in line. If you're charging your car, our express check-in lets you toss the rental agreement on our counter and run.

And if none of these solutions solves your problem, we'll work out one that does. Or at least give you a shoulder to cry on.

Of course, we haven't forgotten the most obvious reason why people come to Hertz.

So we constantly check our Fords and other cars to make sure that whatever else may undermine your travels —they won't.

Hertz

We can help a little.

©HERTZ SYSTEM, INC., 1967

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Intellectuals and McCarthy:
The Radical Specter
Michael Paul Rogin
A thoughtful reinterpretation of the McCarthy phenomenon, rising from an appraisal of the liberal reaction to McCarthyism in the 1950's. Rogin argues that McCarthyism was not an agrarian radical movement and that in misinterpreting McCarthy the intellectual community was led—wrongly—to mistrust all radical uprisings. He discusses the opinions of Richard Hofstadter, Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, Oscar Handlin, Peter Viereck, and William Kornhauser—and offers his own. **$12.50**

The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship between Social Science and Practical Politics
edited by Irving Louis Horowitz
. . . An investigation of the origins and cancellation of the most ambitious social science research project ever attempted by the federal government. Social scientists, political scientists, and statesmen express their views on the Camelot controversy and speculate as to the future of social science research. **$12.00** hardcover, **$2.95** paper MIT71

The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy
by Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey.
Including the text of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action."
"This absorbing and important book, a landmark in social science-public policy studies, is the record of an opportunity perceived, taken, squandered and forgotten. It is the sympathetic record of an attempt to leapfrog what Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former Assistant Secretary of Labor and now director of the M.I.T.-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, was later to call destiny-"-Eliot Fremont-Smith, The New York Times
". . . this is a very important study both of Moynihan's document, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action,* and of the controversy which was stirred up by the book in which white liberals, Negro civil rights champions, and white racists took part."-Reinhold Niebuhr **$12.50** hardcover, **$3.95** paper MIT68

POLITICS
as History, as Social Science

MIT PRESS

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

WHO— WHAT— WHY—

THE TRAGEDY of Vietnam, as the fate of the President's latest appeal makes clear, is the inflexibly unresponsive position of Hanoi. This is what we are up against, and it proves how realistic is the appraisal of experts like **Hanson W. Baldwin,** the Pulitzer Prize-winning military editor of the New York *Times.* Mr. Baldwin's call is for an intensification of the military effort, thus far handicapped by a policy of restraint that has increased the cost and duration of the conflict. . . . An example of the cost is graphically supplied by **Denis Warner's** description of the U.S. Marines' entrenched position below the Demilitarized Zone, where we have sustained our highest casualties of the war. Even though we have exacted a far higher toll on the enemy, it has been at the expense of mobility and of the vitally important pacification program to the rear of the lines.

"THE proudest title of every true Bostonian is that of Liberal," said Mayor John F. Fitzgerald in 1930. What would "Honey Fitz" say today of the success of Mrs. Louise Day Hicks, the champion of Boston's backlash vote in a preliminary election for mayor? **Martin Nolan** of our Washington bureau returned to his native Boston to analyze the discontent of middle-class whites whose support of Mrs. Hicks gives the upcoming Boston contest strong racist overtones. . . . Behind the debate in Congress over the President's proposal for a tax increase and the lawmakers' counterdemand for cuts in Federal expenditures is the question of the role of economists as forecasters of the economy. **Herbert Stein,** a member of the Senior Staff of the Brookings Institution in Washington, explains why many economists advocate the tax surcharge and concludes that the evidence is on their side. . . . Since the death of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, the unifying force of his Congress Party has gradually disintegrated itself and a centrifugal force today seems to be fragmenting the nation. This trend is examined by **Sundar Rajan,** an assistant editor of the Bombay *Times of India.* . . . On balance, the third-party movement of George Wallace of Alabama would seem to prejudice the Republican chances in 1968 more than those of the Democrats. But Wallace's fortunes are currently measured by the polls, and Dr. Gallup's tabulation early in October that a Rockefeller-Reagan ticket with appeal to both liberals and conservatives in the G.O.P. could beat President Johnson adds a new element to the estimate of **Richard M. Scammon.** Mr. Scammon is director of the Election Research Center in Washington and a former director of the Bureau of the Census. . . . **Fernando Krahn's** cartoon is for husbands.

ONE of the ways in which life can be time's fool is indicated by **John McPhee.** Among Mr. McPhee's books are *A Sense of Where You Are: A Profile of William Warren Bradley,* and *Oranges,* both published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux. The former is also available in Bantam paperback. . . . **Richard Bimonte** is a free-lance writer with a particular interest in the work of Eduardo De Filippo. . . . **Norman Jackson,** a Yorkshireman, who spent last year at the University of Iowa, is currently poet-in-residence at Keele University in England. . . . **Sarel Eimerl** has written books for adults and for children on such varied topics as primates and physicians. . . . **Ernest W. Lefever** is the author of *Crisis in the Congo* (Brookings) and of *Ethics and United States Foreign Policy* (Meridian paperback). His next book, *Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation,* will be published in November by Johns Hopkins. . . . A political scientist on the faculty at Yale, **Roger D. Masters** is currently in France as a Guggenheim fellow. He is the author of *The Nation Is Burdened: American Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Knopf), and of a forthcoming study, *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau* (Princeton).

Our autumnal cover is by **Eugene Weinger.**

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Know what's keeping them warm there on the floor? The floor.

Ordinarily, they'd be chilled in no time. But that isn't an ordinary floor. It's heated.

Warming a room by heating its surfaces isn't new. The ancient Romans did it by building charcoal fires beneath their floors.

Today, we do it a lot better using hydronics—heating with mechanically-circulated water. We call our hydronics system Bell & Gossett Hydro-Flo® Heating. B&G Hydro-Flo Heating warms a room by radiation—the same way you're warmed by the sun. Hot water flows through finger-sized tubing concealed in the floor or ceiling—or in baseboard panels.

The heat from these panels radiates a soft, even sunshine warmth throughout the room. There are no hot or cold spots, or damp walls or chilly floors.

B&G Hydro-Flo Heating is versatile. You can automatically maintain different temperatures in different parts of the house. You can even embed the tubing in your walks and driveway to keep them free of ice and snow.

So if you're building a new home or remodeling an old one, let our Bell & Gossett people help. Home comfort has been their business for 50 years.

International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, New York, N.Y.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TTT

There are over 600,000 words in the English language. But not one can really describe just how good J&B is. So when it comes to *anyone's* word on J&B—don't take it.

Take a drink of J&B instead.

Savor its special taste for yourself. You'll discover the flavor of J&B is unique. Far better than any words can convey. Far better than the scotch you used to think was great.

And you'll be anxious to pass the good word along. When you do, do it right. Forget all the superlatives; all the glorious adjectives. And simply insist they taste J&B for themselves.

Because now you know that only tasting is truly believing.

no man can really tell a woman about it

The unique flavor of J&B Rare Scotch

pennies more in cost
worlds apart in quality
the premium product of
JUSTERINI & BROOKS
founded 1749



86 Proof Blended Scotch Whisky • The Paddington Corporation, N.Y. 20, N.Y.

CORRESPONDENCE

GREEN BERETS

To the Editor: I have read with interest John F. Mason's article "Whom the Gods Love" (*The Reporter*, September 21). It is a well-written and realistic portrayal of the uncommon environment in which our Army's Special Forces soldier lives. I believe, too, that the article reflects the truly remarkable efforts of our Green Berets in giving Vietnamese and Montagnard villagers security, better health, and hope for the future.

BRUCE PALMER, JR.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commanding General
APO San Francisco

To the Editor: As the interrogation officer for the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, during 1966 in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam, I can appreciate the accuracy of John Mason's interesting commentary on Duc Co Special Forces' outpost and its environs. I had several occasions to visit and work directly with these men, including Sergeant Howard Stevens, and can attest to the tenuous circumstances under which they operated. Sergeant Stevens's intelligence network, one of the more established and refined in Pleiku Province, was a tribute to his experience and personal effort in South Vietnam.

W. STEPHEN SABOM
Protestant Episcopal Seminary
Alexandria, Virginia

To the Editor: *The Reporter* of September 21 is far superior to any previous issue that I can recall. John F. Mason's "Whom the Gods Love" is a little masterpiece.

C. M. MATHEWS
Anniston, Alabama

AN END TO CHARITY

To the Editor: With all due respect to the planners of our "war on poverty" ("Advice to the Urban Coalition," by Eli Ginzberg, *The Reporter*, September 7), they still seem to me as futile as a physician who would prescribe only a febrifuge for a patient suffering from tuberculosis. So far nothing has been offered which will make the slum dweller more full of self-respect. He is to be kept eternally a beneficiary of charity.

Also I dislike very much the term "ghetto" in connection with our cities. The man who lived in the ghetto was there because condemned to that place for life and there was no escape. Few there are who will continue in slum conditions once they have an income adequate for decent living. Two ways I might suggest are:

(1) To subsidize employers, by tax rebates or in some other manner, when their list of employees shows employment at decent wages of members of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cornell University Press

READABLE BOOKS FOR READERS WHO READ

Leaders and Men of the Easter Rising
Dublin 1916

Edited by F. X. Martin. "The essays collected by F. X. Martin . . . deal thoughtfully with some of the issues that flared up in Dublin in 1916 and that led ultimately to independence. . . . They reveal the extent to which the struggle for identity was personal as well as national."—*Atlantic Monthly.*
260 pages. $5.95

Elizabethans Errant
The Strange Fortunes of Sir Thomas Sherley and His Three Sons

By D. W. Davies. As ambassadors and secret agents, pirates and government officials, army officers, debtors, and world travelers, the Sherleys were legends in their own time. With wit and urbanity D. W. Davies traces their extravagant adventures. *6 illustrations.*
368 pages. $7.50

The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture

By David Brion Davis. Winner, Pulitzer Prize in General Nonfiction, 1967. "A large, immensely learned, readable, exciting, disturbing . . . volume, one of the most important to have been published on the subject of slavery in modern times. . . . The book is brilliant." M. I. Finley, *N. Y. Review of Books.*
520 pages. $10.00

Henry James
A Reader's Guide

By S. Gorley Putt. "A provocative stimulant for the Jamesian scholar, as Mr. Putt . . . knows the world of James, his critics, and his numerous detractors, and is able to balance these elements perceptively."—*Virginia Quarterly Review.*
432 pages. $6.95
($2.95 in paperback)

The Failures of Criticism
Emended edition of "Writers and Their Critics"

By Henri Peyre. With new examples Professor Peyre has revised and expanded his lively evaluation of critical writing. "His scholarship is rich, vital, and extensive; his thought, brilliant."—from a review of *Writers and Their Critics* in *South Atlantic Quarterly.*
384 pages. $8.75
($2.95 in paperback)

Willa Cather and Her Critics

Edited by James Schroeter. "A generous collection of critical essays on Cather selected with the intent of showing the changing critical appraisal of her work from the 1920's to 1965. The writers include H. L. Mencken, Carl Van Doren, Edmund Wilson, Sinclair Lewis, Joseph Wood Krutch, Rebecca West, David Daiches, Louise Bogan, Alfred Kazin, Henry Steele Commager, Howard Mumford Jones, and the editor."—*American Library Association Booklist.*
408 pages. $10.00

The Morality of Scholarship

Essays by Northrop Frye, Stuart Hampshire, and Conor Cruise O'Brien. Edited and with a Foreword by Max Black. The authors probe the complex questions of scholarly commitments and their relationship to the scholar's social responsibilities. This is the inaugural volume of Cornell's new *Studies in the Humanities* series.
108 pages. $4.50



At your bookstore or from

Cornell University Press
ITHACA, NEW YORK 14850

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The most authoritative book on LSD—

LSD, MAN & SOCIETY

Edited by RICHARD C. DEBOLD AND RUSSELL C. LEAF

The facts about LSD—its pharmacological characteristics and effects, its impact on the individual and on society—soberly stated and analyzed by nine authoritative scientists.

Contributors: **Frank Barron, Ph.D. · Neil Chayet, LL.B. Nicholas Giarman, Ph.D. · Murray Jarvik, M.D., Ph.D. · Milton Joffe, Ph.D. · Albert Kurland, M.D. · Donald Louria, M.D. Walter Pahnke, M.D., Ph.D. · Dominick Purpura, M.D. $5.00**

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PRESS
Middletown, Connecticut 06457

USO IS THERE... ONLY IF YOU CARE

Who cares if he's up to his neck in a rice paddy, six thousand miles from home? Who cares what he does, when his ship comes in to that teeming foreign port? You care, when you give to USO. Because USO is there, bringing the grateful handclasp from home to faraway places. Bringing entertainment and laughter to our loneliest outposts. Offering a choice of conduct to our servicemen in overcrowded cities and camp towns here and overseas.

Remember, civilian-supported USO depends entirely on your contribution to your local United Fund or Community Chest. Give, because USO is there, only if you care!

the so-called minority groups in full proportion or ratio of their number to the total population.

(2) To forbid unions, under stiff penalties, to deny membership to any applicant of good moral character, regardless of race, color, or any other characteristic.

The lot of our Negro fellow citizen, and I include all others who find themselves in like predicament, will never be improved by charity. It can only come by giving him an equal income, and expecting him to earn it and earn his place in society like any other citizen.

A. J. BOLINGER
Versailles, Missouri

To the Editor: I read Eli Ginzberg's article with great interest. It is very thoughtful and I hope will be helpful to us in the Urban Coalition. It is an article each member of the Steering Committee should see. I shall see that they see it.

WILLIAM L. SLAYTON
Executive Vice President
Urban America, Inc.
Washington, D.C.

ZEN EXPERIENCES

To the Editor: I have read with considerable interest Anne Fremantle's remarks on *Mystics and Zen Masters* ("Out of Time, Out of Place," *The Reporter*, September 21) and am especially interested in her statement "The inadequacy of expressing what can only be experienced has an unexpected advantage in that the stammerings of those who have been 'there and back again' are unmarked by time or place."

We do have a number of modern science books that cannot be adequately translated into Hottentot or Otomi, but I do not know of any mystical experience, including both the Zen of Zen experience and the "Zen" of modern dialecticians, that has not some term in Sanskrit. I have a whole manuscript of the great Chinese Ch'an Master Tai Hsu in plain English, easily comprehended by a thinking person. We do not allow non-scientists to fill the libraries with their works on the sciences, but we do permit non-Zenists to fill the libraries with their literature. I am not protesting against this practice, but against the lethargy with which Americans study Oriental culture.

SAMUEL L. LEWIS
San Francisco

HUNGER IN THE DELTA

To the Editor. I feel that I should add a footnote to my article "Darkness on the Delta" (*The Reporter*, September 21). Mississippi recently issued a report on hunger among Delta Negroes, a report so strong that Charles Evers, the tough field secretary of the NAACP in Mississippi, said that the earlier report "Hungry Children," released by the Southern Regional Council, should be

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

junked and the Mississippi one substituted.

After the furore blew up over whether there was hunger in Mississippi's Delta, Governor Paul B. Johnson, Jr., quietly dispatched a team of physicians to take a look and report back to him. After they did so, Governor Johnson said their findings were of no hunger. But the report was made public, and its vivid description of the miserable living conditions of these people and the malnutrition that is commonplace caused Evers to make his remark.

FOSTER DAVIS
Greenville, Mississippi

KRAHN'S SUPERMAN

To the Editor: Fernando Krahn is a satirist and a soothsayer. His cartoon in the September 21 issue, showing Superman standing in a ravine holding together the split ends of a railroad track, unable to let go as train after train—and year after year—goes by, probably wasn't meant to satirize the predicament the United States is getting itself into. But it does just that for one who feels that our nation, while trying to play Superman before the world, is becoming stuck in a position from which it dare not budge, even though that position absorbs all its energies and arrests its own development.

MELVIN ARCHER
New York City

SAIGON ELECTIONS

To the Editor: As one who has always found Denis Warner's reporting from Vietnam to be clear-headed and fair, I am predisposed to take his evaluation of the election process there ("South Vietnam Exists," *The Reporter*, September 21) as accurate, as far as it goes. But I wonder what justification he has for speaking so confidently about President-elect Thieu's intentions of "forming a new broader-based government."

There is not much precedent for suggesting that the military leaders *want* a broader-based government and even less to indicate that many who ran against Thieu and Ky—not to mention those who were not allowed to run, or who now openly attack the elections' fairness—would consent to serve. More probably, as Warner himself says, the next months will see a narrowing of the government as Thieu or Ky wins the internal struggle for power.

JOHN BARNES
Washington, D.C.



If this were an ordinary gin, we would have put it in an ordinary gin bottle.

PRONOUNCE IT "TANKER-RAY"

DISTILLED & BOTTLED IN LONDON, 100% GRAIN NEUTRAL SPIRITS, 94.6 PROOF • IMPORTED BY J. M. McCUNN & CO., INC., N.Y.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Fabian Bachrach©

Your kind of ambassador?

Your $5 sends John F. Kennedy's *Profiles in Courage*, and nine other carefully chosen American paperbacks, to underdeveloped, book-hungry countries where these books can do the most good. Ed Murrow started BOOKS USA "to help close the book gap." President Johnson says: "I urge all Americans to give BOOKS USA their generous support." Answer the President's appeal; send book packets abroad in your name. ***Send Food for Thought — Give to BOOKS USA, Box 1960-A, Washington, D.C. 20013.***

BOOKS USA

Make checks payable to BOOKS USA. Contributions are tax-deductible. Space donated by this publication.

NEW from Brookings...

A WORLD OF NATIONS
Problems of Political Modernization
Dankwart A. Rustow

An inquiry into the politics of nationhood and modernization, the twin drives that have precipitated the end of colonial empires in Asia and Africa and hastened social change in Latin America. This study compares the political experience of emerging nations with earlier experiences in Europe, North America, Russia and Japan. Cloth: $7.95; Paper: $2.95

CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES
Long-Range Perspectives
John Plank, Editor

A distinguished collection of essays providing a context, historical and global, within which the reader can interpret the unfolding Cuban story and the alternatives confronting the United States in its relations with that nation. Contributors are Raymond Aron, Alfred Grosser, Hanson W. Baldwin, Raymond Carr, Leon Lipson, Bayless Manning, Kalman H. Silvert, Robert F. Smith, J. Wilner Sundelson, Tad Szulc, and Henry Wriston. Introduction by John Plank of Brookings Senior Staff. $6.75

Order from your bookstore or from

The Brookings Institution

THE REPORTER'S NOTES

Rights in Conflict

On September 13, by a vote of 79 to 4, the Senate passed a bill that had been introduced by Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D., North Carolina), to protect "the privacy and the rights of Federal employees." The bill, which faces an uncertain future in the House, is intended to eliminate some of the more outrageous practices of the Federal government so far as psychological testing, political pressures, and abusive interrogations are concerned. "When was the first time you had intercourse with your wife?" an applicant for a National Security Agency job was asked. "Did you have intercourse with her before you were married? How many times?" One issue that may complicate the fate of the bill in the House is the same as that which led to its being amended in the Senate, namely, whether or not certain of its restrictions on the Federal government as a whole should be waived in the case of the CIA and the NSA. This cloak-and-dagger element, combined with the more lurid aspects of the problem as they were developed in subcommittee hearings, has quite naturally taken attention away from another provision of the bill—that which would forbid the government to ask its employees to disclose their race, religion, or national origin.

Until fairly recently, questions about race on applications or other government forms—or requests for photographs which made such questions unnecessary—were taken by civil-rights organizations as prima facie evidence of intention to discriminate. Indeed, some of the more important civil-rights victories in the past were those which resulted in the elimination of any identification of individuals by their race, and it was in this spirit during the 1940's that the Civil Service Commission enjoined the government from further use of employee forms that had required the Federal workers to identify themselves by race.

Thus, in the past few years as Washington set about encouraging its far-flung departments to hire more Negroes—a project requiring at least some racial breakdown of its present employees—it faced some rather tricky problems. And although it has been able to minimize these through its special skill at obfuscation by bureaucratese ("Each inspection should be characterized by: 1) *In-depth factfinding* which probes deeply into all phases of equal employment opportunity . . . 2) *Meaningful* evaluations which zero in on specific problem areas and recognize program achievements . . ."), the question remained of the legitimacy of the government's making any racial classification whatever of its employees.

In 1962 the Civil Service Commission, at the Kennedy administration's request, did its first government-wide racial census. For this project, which it repeated annually, the Commission used a technique known at the time as the "supervisory head count" and since renamed, more delicately, the "visual survey." It entailed agency officials' filing reports on the number of members of various racial and national groups they employed at different civil-service grades.

The trouble came when the Commission decided to change its technique. In 1966 it sent out a card called the "minority status questionnaire" to some 1.7 million Federal workers asking them to identify themselves as "Negro," "Spanish American," "Oriental," "American Indian," or "none of these." The hullabaloo was immediate. From the outset, the Army refused to permit the new system to be used with its employees. In Hawaii there was outrage and refusal to respond.

Even though the response was supposed to be voluntary, Federal

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Build two Jewish libraries.

Yours and ours.

Your membership in the Jewish Publication Society does a lot more than get you free books.

It helps us increase the number of books on Jewish subjects available to you and to the entire English-reading public. Significant books. Evocative books. Books that would never have seen print without the JPS.

JPS is the pioneer (and most active) nonprofit communal publisher of these books in the world. Having published more than 600 titles since it was founded in 1888, with more than 200 titles of outstanding scholarly and general interest now in its catalogue.

A $15 membership contribution entitles you to select five book-units free, regardless of list prices. A $30 contribution lets you choose 10 free book-units. Add them to your library; or give them as gifts.

At the same time you are helping to enlarge the distinguished library of scholarship on Jewish subjects created by the activities of the Society.

Here are a few of the many books of Jewish interest available to JPS members.

THE TORAH, The Five Books of Moses: This new translation prepared by a committee of eminent scholars is hailed as "the most accurate ever published in English." List price, $5. (1 unit on membership.)

MORNING STARS by Zalman Shazar: Reminiscences of his youth by the President of Israel. Warm recollections of the people and events that shaped his life. List price, $4.50. (1 unit on membership.)

BLOOD ACCUSATION by Maurice Samuel: The Strange History of the Beiliss Case. A gripping reconstruction of the ritual-murder trial of an innocent Jewish worker in Kiev in 1913. List price, $6.00. (1 unit on membership.)

PATHWAYS THROUGH THE BIBLE by Mortimer J. Cohen: Makes the Bible accessible to the modern reader. Each Book prefaced by an illuminating essay, difficult passages reworded. Illustrated by Arthur Szyk. List price, $5.00 (1 unit on membership.)

A HISTORY OF THE JEWS by Solomon Grayzel: This definitive one-volume history covers the Babylonian Exile (586 B. C. E.) to present day, prepared with the view of explaining current Jewish life and modern problems. 24 maps, 125 illustrations. List price, $5.00. (1 unit on membership.)

THE JEWS: THEIR HISTORY, CULTURE AND RELIGION, edited by Louis Finkelstein: Each chapter prepared by an eminent authority. A comprehensive study of Judaism in its historical development. List price, $27.50. (5 units on membership.)

MESILLAT YESHARIM by Moses Hayyim Luzzatto: Reprint of an ethical Jewish text by the 18th century mystic, poet and teacher. A popular classic in Jewish literature. Hebrew and English translation. List price, $4.50. (1 unit on membership.)

CAST A GIANT SHADOW by Ted Berkman. (A Covenant Book for children age 11-15.) A biography of Col. Mickey Marcus, the West Point graduate who gave his life to save Jerusalem during Israel's War of Independence. List price, $2.95. (1 unit on membership.)

BOOK OF RUTH: Hebrew text and the English translation handwritten by Franziska Baruch, noted Israeli calligrapher. Illustrated with beautiful woodcuts by Jacob Steinhardt. List price, $5.00. (1 unit on membership.)

THE PROPHETS by Abraham J. Heschel: A clear analysis of the great prophets' concept of God, of their personal piety and sense of justice, and an exposition of how their thinking differs from other religions. List price, $6.00. (1 unit on membership.)

The Jewish Publication Society of America

Dept. R., 222 No. 15 St., Phila., Pa. 19102

Please send me your catalogue and tell me more about membership in JPS. I understand that members who contribute $15 a year may select five book-units, and members contributing $30 may select 10 book-units — from more than 200 JPS books in print.

Name_____

Address_____

City/State/Zip_____

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now you can hear Prokofiev in Russian.

The lyrical glories of Prokofiev now come to us intact from the heart of his homeland. Working with the supreme artists of the Soviet Union, Melodiya/Angel has achieved unsurpassed stereo quality and a Prokofiev series of historic importance. Make room in your collection for the awesome cantatas, *Alexander Nevsky* and *Ivan the Terrible*, the *Buffoon* and *Age of Steel* ballets, the first complete *Cinderella*, his quicksilver *Symphony No. 5* and his *Quintet, Op. 39.*





МЕЛОДИЯ
USSR
MELODIYA | ANGEL

workers complained of coercion and intimidation; and even though the results were incarcerated in the anonymity of a gigantic locked computer, it was apparent that the Commission had crossed a line and that it was now not only requesting identification of *individuals* by race but was also asking them to attest to information about themselves that many, for whatever reason, preferred to withhold. White government workers began to complain to Ervin's subcommittee that they suspected quotas were going to be enforced and they would be the victims; Negro government workers complained to the subcommittee that the reintroduction of the questionnaire was discriminatory. The American Civil Liberties Union testified that it even had doubts about the propriety of the "head count" method, let alone the questionnaire, "except only where rigorous justification is required for such action." And people began to make merry in filling it out: white workers called themselves Negroes, Negroes claimed to be "none of these," and a suspiciously high percentage of American Indians began turning up in unlikely places. It was testimony to how well the earlier efforts of civil-rights groups had worked.

A few months ago the Commission announced that it was abandoning its card and going back to its "visual survey." Nonetheless, there was some objection that Ervin's provision in the rights-and-privacy bill would make it inordinately difficult for any administration to pursue its Equal Employment Opportunity program. If the House fails to act on the bill, the question will become academic, but at this point the line-up on the race provision gives some measure of how confused all the old and new pieties have become.

Governor No

Political opinion sampling in California next month is anticipated with more than usual interest. The Marvin D. Field poll in September showed that Governor Ronald Reagan's popularity had slipped four points between June and September, with those who felt that he was doing a good job dropping from forty-one per cent to thirty-seven per cent. The Democrats have little cause to claim credit for this trend, but they are as eager as the Republicans to learn whether a tax increase put through by the governor will affect his popularity. His supporters among the rich have reason for discontent; on October 31, they must pay half of next year's taxes in advance to tide the state over a year-end deficit. The poor are already angered by his vetoing of poverty programs and his slashing of the state medical-aid program, Medi-Cal. With such a hot climate at home, California's favorite Republican is wise in going out on the hustings this fall to boost his party.

On November 1, the Reagan administration must defend before the California Supreme Court its $210-million cutback in certain Medi-Cal services, a reduction instituted by Reagan because of what he claims is a deficit in the program. The legislature funded it for only $305 million through next year and the Federal government contributed a like amount. Reagan says that accumulated medical bills actually exceed the available money by more than $200 million. Hence his order for a pattern of reduced services to stay within money at hand.

It isn't often that a governor gets haled before state courts to justify administrative belt tightening, and it must be particularly nettling to Reagan that this suit was initiated by a welfare client who is being represented by a Federally funded anti-poverty agency, the California Rural Legal Assistance Project. Reagan complains that the war on poverty has poured $288 million into California since 1964, but "We have found no evidence of any basic change in the state's poverty picture."

Governor Reagan has gone out of his way to boast that his veto record on OEO programs is the highest in the nation. He claims to have topped the combined records of Governors George and Lurleen Wallace in Alabama, with nine vetoes to their seven. (There have been only twenty-eight gubernatorial vetoes, in nine states, in the entire history of some twenty thousand OEO projects in the nation.) Doubtless Reagan

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now wishes that he had nipped the Rural Legal Assistance Project too, before welfare recipient Harvey Morris turned there for advice when he couldn't get his back operated on, following the governor's Medi-Cal reductions.

Morris's Legal Assistance lawyer won a court injunction that has halted Reagan's slash in Medi-Cal. Now the state Supreme Court must decide whether the reductions were ordered in accordance with California law. The argument will center on whether the state administration should have made across-the-board reductions or eliminated categories of eligible persons, rather than picking and choosing to delete certain services. Waiting in the wings for a last word on the subject is Uncle Sam. If the court lets the Reagan cuts stand, such as the veto on preventive dental care, outpatient psychiatric care, drugs outside a hospital, etc., the Federal government will then make its own appraisal of whether these cuts accord with standards that justify matching Federal money.

Governor Reagan got into the veto swing during the last Democratic-dominated legislature. He vetoed eighty-three bills. He also cut some seven hundred positions from state payrolls, reduced the 1967-1968 budget by $43 million, and vetoed another $35 million in special appropriations. Still, all of that together came to less than one per cent of the $5-billion California budget.

AND VETO RECORDS need to be analyzed. The governor's claim to have restrained Federal anti-poverty spending in his state by his repeated "No" doesn't quite stand up. True, he rejected programs representing a total of $360,000. But he has accepted, in barely ten months in office, more than $57 million in OEO funds, 99.3 per cent of all the money proposed for OEO spending in California in that period. He claims to have guided and limited policy in many of the projects he did approve, but it became necessary recently for OEO officials to remind him gently that while they were interested in his views about the programs, Congress had given him only the power to veto, not to set standards.

Medi-Cal, Reagan told a recent San Francisco conference, is "sicker than the people it is designed to help," and left to itself would bankrupt the state. As he travels around the country, Reagan may notice that not one state joined him in this protest, not even New York, whose Medicaid program has wider coverage and greater benefits than California's, and whose governor will also be watching the popularity rating of California's "favorite son."

Pow!

As politicians and public officials grapple with the issue of violence in our cities, it occurs to us that they might be helped along by a few scientific thoughts on the matter from an untapped reservoir of expert opinion—the answers given by members of the American Psychiatric Association to a questionnaire entitled "What Do You Think About Violence?" Although four per cent of the group felt that violence is an intrinsic part of man's nature and cannot be prevented, eighty-five per cent had specific prescriptions to offer. A few of these —"increase punishment for violent acts," "control the sale of guns"—ran along familiar lines, but others offer distinctly novel approaches. Courtesy of the *Smith Kline & French Psychiatric Reporter*, we put them up for grabs: ". . . curb advertising; prevent early toilet training; limit the use of alcohol; study cultures where violence is rare; destroy the myth of the 'wild west'; remove children from unfit parents. . ."

In case there are no takers for any of these, a proved method of providing "acceptable substitutes for violence" was suggested by an episode in the life of one member of the Association. "A neighbor wanted to smear my face with ink," he recalled. "I finally let him and thenceforth had no more trouble."



Now you can hear Shostakovich in Russian.

History's purest and most authentic Shostakovich recordings are now being created—in Russia—by Melodiya/Angel. The full genius of Russian artists, conductors and orchestras has been focused with absolute fidelity on all of the composer's major works. The towering *5th Symphony, The Execution of Stepan Razin,* the premier recording of his opera *Katerina Ismailova,* and his dazzling *9th and 10th symphonies* are all captured with a reverence and sensitivity quite beyond anyone but the countrymen of Shostakovich.



МЕЛОДИЯ
USSR MELODIYA ANGEL

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Vietnam Balance Sheet

HANSON W. BALDWIN

VIETNAM, two years and six months after the United States first sent combat units there, has been to most Americans—whether hawks or doves—a bitter, frustrating experience, and our situation there has been described in sharply contrasting terms. On the one hand, General Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, asserted a few weeks ago that "we are winning the war," and that conceivably we would start withdrawing our troops within the next eighteen months. On the other hand, many reports from Saigon describe the military situation as a stalemate, while some opponents of the war in the United States have warned of an impending holocaust—the broadening of the war to global conflict.

What is the situation, and what are the prospects?

First, the administration's fundamental war policies have not changed. The most important development in 1967 has been the broadening of the bombing of the North. The new target list approved by the White House early in August and augmented later maintained prohibited areas in which targets could not be bombed except with specific Presidential permission: four miles around Haiphong and ten miles around Hanoi. But the other restricted circles—extending out to ten miles around Haiphong and thirty miles around Hanoi—were virtually eliminated. Haiphong and its important port facilities were not included in the new target list, but bridges and nodal points around the port were. Since then the bombing campaign has undertaken what the military call a "shouldering out" process, intended to isolate and close off Haiphong as fas as possible from the rest of the country.

Nonetheless, major restraints and limitations on the conduct of the war, both in the North and the South, continue to be imposed. The war remains a limited war of attrition; it has never really threatened to become unlimited or general.

The Price of Consensus

To the military, if not to President Johnson and to Secretary McNamara, the size and the duration of the Vietnamese war have *not* assumed unexpected proportions. Military leaders forecast privately before U.S. ground units were committed to Vietnam that as many as 500,000 to 750,000 U.S. troops might be needed, and that even then the war would be a long one. Back in the summer of 1965, the military chiefs in Washington, anticipating the requirements of Vietnam and the simultaneous necessity of meeting military commitments elsewhere around the world, urged a limited mobilization, including a call-up of reserves, extension of enlistments and tours of duty, and girding the nation for the major war that Vietnam has since become. But the administration rejected this advice. Instead, it expanded the services with increased draft calls and recruiting and built up the U.S. strength in Vietnam to the present figure of about 460,000 men on the basis of the two-year draft and a one-year tour of duty there.

The policy of gradually increasing United States pressure against the enemy had, the President thought, the advantage of a kind of "consensus" war policy. But it also imposed great military handicaps. It sacrificed the advantages that a rapid intensification of any war effort usually gives to the stronger power. The enemy was able to counter successfully by increased infiltration, strengthened air defenses, and general mobilization.

By contrast, our one-year rotation plan (though highly beneficial to the morale of the men in Vietnam) and the two-year draft—plus the tremendous and rapid expansion of the U.S. armed forces to meet the needs of Vietnam—have caused major turnovers in the services and have resulted in a sharp lowering of the level of experience. Some 550,000 to 600,000 men, for instance, are scheduled to be rotated home from Vietnam in the next twelve months, representing more than one hundred per cent turnover. Furthermore, company commanders are usually shifted every six months or so, while noncoms are in such short supply that the Army has instituted crash courses for them.

THE EFFECTS of this rotation and the attempts at home to minimize the domestic effects of the war by living off military inventories and holding down military production have been felt all down the line in Vietnam. Though no one will officially admit it, the result undoubtedly has been an increase in U.S. casualties. The first units committed to Vietnam were professionals; today, despite a veneer of professionalism, our forces have suffered from dilution of experienced personnel and veteran leadership.

The air war in the North has also been handicapped by the policy of gradualism. The administration's desire not to alarm the electorate and to minimize the risks of increased Chinese and Soviet intervention provide the justification for the sporadic character of the bombing campaign; even so, the logic of the target-selection system has defied analysis. The docks at Campha have been hit, but Haiphong, the principal entry point for about seventy-five per cent of North Vietnam's imports, is still largely immune to bombing. Some of the rivers of North Vietnam have been mined, but not the coastal waterways. Hanoi's dredge that helps

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

keep the Red River Delta open—a sitting duck for naval gunfire or bombs—still keeps the channel to Haiphong clear. Targets generally have been bombed too little and too late and every prospective target has to be confirmed and reconfirmed all up the line. Although the weight of the bombing has been great in both relative and absolute terms, much of it has been frittered away on inconsequential targets.

More important, interdiction of the flow of military supplies into North Vietnam from China and from North Vietnam to the South has been intermittent rather than continuous. This was partly due to the monsoon weather, which is now swathing North Vietnam once again in mist and clouds, and partly to the various bombing pauses inspired by vain political hopes of a negotiated peace. But for the most part it reflected the decisions taken by Secretary McNamara and the President. Until the investigation of the bombing by Senator John C. Stennis, the repeat and restrike missions essential to keep bridges destroyed and roads and railroads interrupted have been as rigidly controlled from Washington as the original strikes. The Paul Doumer Bridge across the Red River at Hanoi, for instance, is perhaps the most important single bridge in North Vietnam. The administration has permitted it to be bombed once; the essential follow-up strikes, which should be scheduled on an almost daily basis to keep it out of operation, have not been permitted.

In South Vietnam, another factor has had a hobbling effect on the course of the war. Unlike the Korean War with its unified command, the war in Vietnam presents an untidy picture organizationally. There is no unified command; the South Vietnamese government is a sovereign government, even though it is subject to strong pressure from the United States. We can propose but not dispose. General William C. Westmoreland, the United States commander in Vietnam, has been fully conscious from the beginning of the limitations of his power vis-à-vis the Vietnamese.

The record of the South Vietnamese armed forces, while not by any means as black as U.S. opponents of the war like to claim, has been extremely spotty. Some units, unfortunately too few, have demonstrated both courage and combat effectiveness. They have been blessed by good leaders, a quality rare in undeveloped countries and particularly so in Vietnam, where many of the best of the regimental, battalion, and company-grade officers have been killed during years of warfare, and where the heritage of the French system has handicapped the development of natural leadership. Many of South Vietnam's units, commanded by politically appointed officers, have miserable records.



All this means that the administration's war policies have made a long and costly war longer and more costly.

Wearing Down the North

Nonetheless, it is abundantly clear, except perhaps to the opposition on the home front, that the war is not being lost. There is no doubt that the risks of the administration's Vietnamese policy have been highly exaggerated by the President's opponents as each new target has been added to the bombing list. Washington's assessment of Soviet and Chinese courses of action in Vietnam has been triumphantly vindicated. The government's Hong Kong experts have been saying for the past year that Peking, completely absorbed in political and civil strife verging on civil war, is unlikely to risk a major confrontation with the United States. To the Soviet Union, whose split with China is wider now than before the war, Vietnam is a war to be fought by proxy, not with Russian blood. Today it seems less likely than ever that either of the great Communist powers will directly intervene in Vietnam.

Furthermore, the war of attrition is costing the enemy far more than it is costing the United States and its allies. Where the United States is spending about $25 to $30 billion annually on the war—three to four per cent of its gross national product—the undeveloped economy of the Vietcong and the primitive economic structure of North Vietnam are devoted almost entirely to the war effort, and both China and Russia have contributed a considerable portion of their arms production and transportation capabilities.

North Vietnam's manpower is unquestionably under severe and growing strain. Perhaps half of its fourteen regular divisions are now in South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, or deployed along or near the Demilitarized Zone. Thousands of additional men operate coast-defense batteries and antiaircraft guns and missiles, while an estimated 300,000 full-time workers and another 300,000 part-time laborers are assigned to the never-ending job of repairing

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bomb-damaged bridges, roads, and railroads and trying to keep the distribution and supply system operating.

General John P. McConnell, Air Force Chief of Staff, summed it up in his testimony before the Stennis subcommittee: "The nature of the economy of North Vietnam has undergone a decided change. Export tonnage has steadily decreased since 1965. This is due primarily to air-strike damage to production and transportation facilities. Coal exports have been cut in half and phosphate exports have virtually ceased. Cement, which was exported, is now imported, and pig-iron production capability has in effect been eliminated. . . . during 1967 North Vietnam is expected to import four times more tonnage than is exported. The increase in imports, together with the difficulties faced in transporting the commodities on his interdicted transportation network, has resulted in port congestion, increased offloading times for ships and a growing pile-up of materials on the docks."

Thus the bombing campaign, which, like a naval blockade, can be effective only with time, is slowly but increasingly weakening North Vietnam.

In terms of casualties, the enemy has suffered disproportionate losses. Since January 1, 1961, to September 30, 1967, the United States has suffered about 13,500 battle deaths in Vietnam and about 86,000 cases of nonfatal wounds. These appear to be high figures in absolute terms—and of course, measured in terms of human suffering, a single casualty is one too many. But in relative terms and compared to the enemy's casualties they are small. U.S. battle deaths in Vietnam, the Army figures (the Marines, more exposed along the DMZ, have higher statistics), are at a little more than half the rate of the Second World War, and about forty-five per cent of Korea's rate.

The South Vietnamese have lost an estimated 49,901 killed, and other United States allies fighting in Vietnam (Koreans, Australians, etc.) have suffered about 1,268 killed. As against these figures, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese together have lost an estimated 221,784 men killed in action.

The available evidence supports the conclusion that the enemy, though by no means at the end of his rope, is having difficulty replacing his losses. In South Vietnam many indigenous Vietcong battalions are now partly North Vietnamese. Many are under strength. The Vietcong has resorted repeatedly to impressment and, like the North Vietnamese, to the use of women.

Four Wars

But there are other indices of victory or defeat that are not susceptible of precise analysis. And despite the important attrition effects of the bombing of the North, it remains true that the Vietnamese War must be won in the South, although each interacts on the other. In some aspects of what the military call the "in-country" war, the balance sheet is clearly in our favor; in others the entries are still in the red.

There are really four different types of warfare now being fought in South Vietnam. Each affects the others and all are influenced by the bombing of the North and the U.S. Navy's coastal and river blockade.

The war along the Demilitarized Zone has assumed a character different in major respects from other types of war in South Vietnam. Both sides are deeply dug in. The enemy, with hundreds of alternative firing positions in caves or dug deeply into the ground just across the 17th parallel in North Vietnam, has concentrated scores of artillery pieces, mortars, and rockets in the area. These have exacted high casualties from Marines dug in at gun positions and fortified camps at Con Thien and elsewhere along the DMZ. This warfare has some of the character of the heavy bombardments and trench and dugout warfare of the First World War; the enemy's use of caves and tunnels for his gun emplacements is also reminiscent of the Japanese defense of some island positions in the Second World War. Heavy B-52 and fighter-bomber attacks on the enemy positions and the use of artillery and naval gunfire have reduced but not eliminated this enemy threat. Some three to four North Vietnamese divisions are still astride or near the DMZ, making it necessary for the Marines to maintain large forces near the zone to meet the threat of a major incursion.

Two indices—the recommissioning next year of the battleship *New Jersey*, whose sixteen-inch shells will be able to search out the enemy's protected gun positions well inland, and the extension of the "McNamara Line" obstacle along the DMZ, which cannot be even partially ready until next summer—show that this form of indecisive warfare, costly to both sides, is likely to continue for some time.

That part of the cleared area, or "obstacle," already finished—the military insist it cannot be a "barrier"—may well be useful in the current monsoon season. The enemy will probably utilize this period of enforced lull in U.S. air support to intensify his efforts across the DMZ. The cleared strip, which provides an open field of fire for the Marines and is equipped with barbed-wire obstacles, mines, and warning devices, is intended to cover the most easily accessible routes of approach from North to South. Further inland where the jagged mountain masses and dense rain forests rise up to the Laotian border, the extension of this strip will present major technical and engineering difficulties, though it is still being pushed in the Pentagon. At its best, even if it were extended along the entire South Vietnamese border, it could reduce infiltration but not halt it, and its effectiveness would be dependent upon the artillery positions, infantry battalions, and air support that covered it.

The second type of warfare, reminiscent in some ways of the infantry jungle warfare of the Second World War, is marked by intermittent clashes with main-force Vietcong and North Vietnamese units. Despite some reverses, U.S. forces—now bearing the main burden of the struggle against the enemy's regular units—hold the initiative and have won the upper hand. United States-South Vietnamese search-and-destroy missions have penetrated most of the enemy's base areas in South Vietnam—bases heavily stocked with food, ammunition, and supplies that had never been attacked until last year. Most of the main-force units in South Vietnam, both Vietcong and North Vietnamese, have been decimated time and again and have had

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be reconstituted at great cost. There is now no area in South Vietnam where the enemy can be secure against air or ground attack.

These setbacks have apparently delayed the enemy's attempt to advance to the classic Phase III of guerrilla warfare: the transformation of part-time guerrilla units into full-time formal battalions, regiments, and divisions. The United States is clearly "winning"—though slowly—this phase of the war. But strengthened by sanctuary areas for rest and recuperation in Laos and Cambodia, the back of the main-force units has not been broken. And the end of this type of warfare is not in sight.

In the two other forms of warfare in South Vietnam—the struggle against the guerrillas and terrorists, and in support of pacification—the United States and its allies can claim considerably less progress.

The United States does not have enough manpower in Vietnam to hold all the areas it has cleared, and has been faced with the heartbreaking task of clearing the same areas over and over again. Nevertheless, there has been a gradual extension of the United States-South Vietnamese areas of control, and most of the productive and populated areas of South Vietnam are now under at least the nominal control of Saigon. There has also been a marked improvement in the opening of communications—roads, railroads, and waterways—although most of the roads of Vietnam that are now classified as "open" are safe only for armed convoys or unarmed Vietnamese peasants, not for lone Americans.

The Vietcong guerrilla organization, though under strain like the rest of the enemy organization, shows no sign of collapse and gave some convincing evidences of its strength, fanaticism, discipline, and organization in the widespread attacks, terrorism, and kidnappings that preceded the Vietnamese elections of September 3. The continued strength of the guerrillas is in turn a reflection of Saigon's and Washington's greatest weakness in Vietnam—the failure to make major progress in the struggle for the "hearts and minds of the people." The excesses of the Vietcong and the sheer weight of American power, with its attraction to those who want to be on the winning side, have probably offset the economic and psychological disadvantages of the massive American presence and the mistakes and weaknesses of the Saigon government. Pacification has not so much lost ground as it has failed to make much progress, and pacification alone can confirm victory.

The Need to Reorganize

It is clear, or ought to be, from any summary appraisal of the war situation that the ultimate outcome of

the war in Vietnam does not have to be defeat. In 1950-1951 exactly the same derogatory phrases now being applied to South Vietnam were tagged to South Korea. The South Koreans "would not fight"; they had corrupt and political generals; Syngman Rhee was an Oriental dictator and an American puppet; South Korea had no capability of self-government and could never develop a viable economy. It has taken fifteen years and there are still U.S. troops in South Korea, but all those sour predictions of the past have been proved false. To be sure, South Korea had considerable advantages South Vietnam does not have; its national identity was better established, for one thing. But South Vietnam, the rice bowl of the region, is inherently a much wealthier area, and its people are just as talented.

The course of the war even now can be shortened. The intensification of the bombing of the North since Senator Stennis opened his investigation of the campaign must continue, and all the important targets in the North—particularly supply and communications choke points—must be paralyzed or isolated. The "shouldering out" process around the important port of Haiphong and the attacks on the docks of Campha that President Johnson quietly authorized in August must continue as weather permits during the monsoon season, and the rail and road lines to China and the key crossings over the Red River must be hit again and again.

In the South, a major increase in the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese armed forces will probably require a greater degree of United States military as well as political authority and control. The Marine Combined Action companies and platoons in South Vietnam's I Corps area provide a small starting point in this direction. The Combined Action units—a squad of United States Marines with about a platoon of the normally ill-kempt, poorly armed, low-morale Popular Forces—have developed a proud record. The units are static; that is, they are assigned to the protection of specific villages or hamlets and they remain in those positions. The Marines exercise *de facto* if not *de jure* command. Their example has transformed a ragged group of militia into smart, eager young soldiers; not a single village protected by a Combined Action unit has been lost to the enemy, and—even more remarkable—there has not been a single South Vietnamese deserter or defector from such units. Even more important, the Marine experience has been that once the people are convinced that the units are in place to stay, the peasants expose the Vietcong bases left behind when guerrilla and main-force units leave the area.

In any case, more effective use of Vietnamese manpower and the reorganization of the South Vietnamese armed forces are essential to the winning of the war in the South, where ultimately the war must be won. This may and probably will mean the addition of more United States manpower, perhaps beyond the 525,000 figure authorized by next June. But the nineteen additional United States battalions—more than two divisions—that are scheduled to reinforce units now in Vietnam in

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



the next nine or ten months could provide enough additional power if the South Vietnamese armed forces are more effectively used and if the interdiction campaign is intensified.

FINALLY, the temptation to pare the military budget—already exemplified by President Johnson's tentative order to the Pentagon to reduce planned military spending by some $3 billion during the current fiscal year—must be resisted, despite political, economic, and psychological pressures. The effects of penny pinching in war are widespread and incalculable; it is a policy that cannot be defended to the relatives of men killed and wounded in Vietnam.

As the United States election campaigns open, President Johnson is faced with a painful dilemma. To achieve any politically fruitful results before November, 1968, the administration must step up the military pressure, if only to negotiate. But even a major escalation is unlikely to force a cease-fire, on any basis that Mr. Johnson could accept, until Hanoi has interpreted U.S. public opinion by the ballot next year. Thus the President is faced with a vicious circle—the consequences of a consensus war policy. He must win the battle of the ballots to win in Vietnam, yet he must probably "win" in Vietnam—in the sense of demonstrating before next November his capability of bringing the war to a satisfactory conclusion—if he is to win at home.

Bearing the Brunt At Con Thien

DENIS WARNER

DANANG

THE MONSOONS came to central Vietnam in September, a month earlier than the Marines' engineers had prepared for, filling the trenches at Gio Linh with water and turning the defenses at Con Thien into a boghole. The McNamara Line, the 2,000-foot-wide cleared strip that now runs the full six miles between these two outposts south of the Demilitarized Zone, has sprouted new undergrowth, through which the enemy forces now pass freely. The all-weather road from the logistics center at Dong Ha to Con Thien is unfinished, adding seriously to the problems of supply in weather made to order for the North Vietnamese artillery in the DMZ.

The long-range artillery position at Gio Linh and the Con Thien camp are the main targets in Hanoi's summer-fall campaign, which began in July. These two bare and bloody knolls, similar in concept and vulnerability to the positions the French mounted on the plain of Dien Bien Phu under the guns of the Vietminh, have acquired a significance out of all proportion to their tactical worth. That it was a military blunder to have established such outposts in such positions is now admitted off the record. Yet to abandon them would appear to be a humiliating defeat for the Marines. Abandonment would also have a profound impact politically and psychologically in the five embattled northern provinces that make up the I Corps Area—which is, of course, precisely what Hanoi's seemingly formless but in fact highly organized and co-ordinated summer-fall campaign planned to achieve.

It is still unclear whether the actions unfolding here, including reports of North Vietnamese withdrawals from the DMZ in October, will be regarded one day as the dying gasp of the defeated Communist armies or as the precursor of similar campaigns in other corps areas. Continuing and wide-scale desertions from the Vietcong among the Montagnards is one of the more heartening indicators in II Corps, the central part of South Vietnam. In III Corps, the Saigon region, dry weather is just ahead, and General William C. Westmoreland is preparing once again to step up operations with confidence that the general security situ-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ation there is much improved. Against this, intelligence reports continue to emphasize the concentrations of Communist matériel and manpower on the Cambodian and Laotian borders.

There is no doubt, however, that the battles that have swirled across I Corps' coastal rice and corn fields and into the foothills and mountains of the Annamite Chain represent an evolution in military science. With skill, flexibility, and a sureness that was hitherto lacking, General Vo Nguyen Giap, the North Vietnamese commander-in-chief, has executed the three-level (guerrilla, regional, and main-force) concept of co-ordinated revolutionary warfare devised by General Nguyen Chi Thanh, commander of the Communist field forces in the South until his death last July. Beside this evolution, it is only of peripheral interest, for instance, that B-52 bombers of the Strategic Air Command are now being used in the tactical defense of a battalion outpost or that both sides are using tear gas.

Setting the Stage

Although the actions by the North Vietnamese regular forces in the winter-spring campaign this year were pressed vigorously and sometimes with damaging effect, there were vital weaknesses in the overall effort. Planning was too rigid. Co-ordination with the regional and guerrilla forces in the rear was patchy, at best.

Viewing this period with hindsight, it is now patent that these actions were essentially tentative and exploratory. Just as Giap experimented with frontal assault and shock waves at the beleaguered French outpost of Nasam in December, 1952, and learned there that he needed heavier weapons and different tactics, so was he bound to feel his way carefully here south of the six-mile-wide Demilitarized Zone in his attempt to achieve tactical superiority in the face of the overwhelming allied strategic superiority. Inevitably, he made blunders and suffered bitter defeats. His weapons, though new and sophisticated, were inadequate. The guerrillas in the rear failed to match the efforts of the main forces at the front. Nevertheless, the effort was sufficiently serious to cause the Marines to move into the northern two-thirds of I Corps and for General Westmoreland to reinforce their rear with three U.S. Army brigades, operating under the code name of Task Force Oregon.

By late May, when the North Vietnamese winter-spring offensive came to an end, the Marines had swept through the southern part of the Demilitarized Zone, resettled fifteen thousand villagers living there, and established themselves, however unwisely, in the frontier posts, notably the Khe Sanh "trail listening" position, close to the Laotian border; Con Thien, on the western extremity of the McNamara Line; and Gio Linh, from which 175-

millimeter Long Toms with a range of twenty miles blazed away into North Vietnamese territory.

GIAP opened the summer campaign quietly. His three regular divisions committed to the border fight, the 324th B, the 325th, and the 341st, pulled back in June into sanctuaries in Laos and the northern part of the Demilitarized Zone. Although a good deal of maneuvering went on in the southern part of the corps area, there were no substantial fights. The 1st North Vietnamese Army Regiment in Quang Ngai moved north into Quang Tin and joined up with its parent division, the 2nd NVA Division. Two battalions of U.S. Marines moved from Chu Lai into a valley on the Quang Nam-Quang Tin border, thus setting the scene for some violent action early in September.

By far the most important development during that period, as subsequent actions on both the main-force and the guerrilla level were soon to reveal, was the further improvement in Communist weaponry. The relatively crude and inaccurate but easily transported 140-mm. rocket and the mortars used in the spring attacks on the outposts and at Dong Ha, Phu Bai, and Danang had been more a source of irritation than of major concern. They did not seriously hurt the Marines or put them to digging in their static posts, and they were not effective against the blockhouses used by the South Vietnamese Popular and Regional Forces, whose task is to guard strategic centers for the government.

The first major shock came with the attack on the Danang airfield on July 15. In addition to the 140-mm. rocket, the enemy used for the first time the 122-mm. stabilized Soviet barrage rocket, which is fired from a launcher standing six feet high. It is more accurate and hits harder than the 140; and because of its longer range it increased the rocket belt area around vulnerable installations by forty per cent, thus absorbing more troops in pure defense. Danang airfield suffered heavily in the first fifty-round barrage, with losses running into millions of dollars. The casualties were relatively light—eight killed and 163 wounded—but damage to aircraft and to the bomb-storage area, in particular, was heavy.

As the campaign unfolded, the Vietcong and Northern troops used the 122-mm. rocket in widely scattered parts of the battlefield. To its lethal thrust the North Vietnamese added a new family of mortars and artillery, including long-range 130-mm. and 152-mm. guns. Tucked away in the mountains in the northern part of the Demilitarized Zone, defying efforts by U.S. Navy guns and the B-52s to destroy them, these guns kept Con Thien and Gio Linh under constant though irregular attack. The barrage reached a peak of 550 rounds a day in August and gathered weight again when the rains came in September. At other

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

times, obviously when the guns were being moved, no more than thirty to forty rounds a day were fired, but this was enough to force the Marines to shift the 175s from Gio Linh, thus relieving some of the pressure along their northern lines of communication leading to the Demilitarized Zone.

An equally significant development was the appearance of a flat-trajectory, high-velocity weapon that shattered the South Vietnamese blockhouses. In effect, the Communist regional forces now had their own artillery. Inevitably, this development caused an immediate decline in morale among government irregulars, exposed the Revolutionary Development cadres to new and graver dangers, and sealed the lips of the Vietnamese civilians, even in areas that had been regarded as more or less secure. "Every villager in the area knows where those damned rockets are being fired from in Quang Nam," an Australian adviser told me. "But do you think we ever get a tipoff? Not on your bloody life we don't!"

The Big Battles

With American base areas now coming under heavy attack and with the North Vietnamese main forces engaging both the Marines and the South Vietnamese Regular Forces in an offensive designed to cause maximum casualties and to divert allied efforts from the pacification areas, the Communist regional forces and guerrillas stepped up their offensive in the rear. Ground fighting developed around Con Thien and through the countryside in the Con Thien-Gio Linh-Dong Ha-Camp Carroll trapezoid. It broke out violently in Quang Tin. Hard-hit Revolutionary Development cadres deserted by the score. Roads and hamlets that had been relatively secure became totally insecure. Even provincial capitals were no longer immune from hit-and-run raids intended both to demonstrate Vietcong strength and to liberate prisoners. In Hoi An, the capital of Quang Nam Province, and in Quang Ngai city, the raids succeeded and 2,400 Vietcong were set free to return to the war. At Tam Ky, the Vietcong were knocked back, though they returned to the fray.

Among the blazing actions of these few months, several battles on both sides stand out, and none more than the first violent conflict that marked the opening of the summer campaign on July 2. "B" Company of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Marines, on patrol northwest of Con Thien, ran into a carefully prepared North Vietnamese ambush. About a company of Northerners, wearing U.S. Marine helmets and flak jackets, opened fire on the Marines with flamethrowers, machine guns, mortars, and artillery. "B" Company was pinned down and split into three groups. "A" Company moved to reinforce on the left flank and came under heavy mortar fire; it too was pinned down.

A message for help went out, and just before noon "C" Company came in by helicopter from Dong Ha and

landed to the rear of "B" Company. At the same time, a platoon of tanks and an infantry platoon were dispatched to attack from the west and to link up with "B" Company. With the pressure apparently relieved, "A" Company tried to evacuate its casualties. But as the helicopters came in to pick up the wounded, the Northerners launched a heavy mortar attack, inflicting new casualties and preventing the evacuation.

Carrying their wounded and all possible equipment and shepherded by the tanks, "C" Company began to withdraw toward "A" Company —and into another ambush. Two tanks struck mines. Then, under cover of protecting fire, Northern troops who had been taking shelter in a long trench system tried to close with the Marines. But the troops were driven off by air strikes.

Late in the afternoon, the four battered companies again came under artillery fire, more than two hundred rounds falling among their positions. At 5:15 P.M. they were relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Marines, evacuated their casualties, and moved into the Con Thien complex to count their losses. By any standards, they were fearfully high: eighty-eight killed in action, twenty-seven missing, and 170 wounded.

IF THERE WAS any consolation, it was that the Marines' year-long enemies from the 324B Division had suffered much greater losses. By count, 310 Northerners were claimed killed. But the Northerners were clearly prepared to accept this scale of losses, and for the next two and a half months they continued to maintain the pressure over a wide field south of the Demilitarized Zone. They laid ambushes for supply columns moving west of Dong Ha. They dug trenches and set ambushes in areas through which they knew the Marines were sure to sweep. They infiltrated rockets south of the line and hammered the air base at Phu Bai.

On the night of September 2-3 they destroyed the ammunition dump at Dong Ha. The first salvo of fifteen rounds landed about an hour after dark, bracketing the ammunition dump. With the second salvo, the rockets dropped squarely in the center of the dump of fifteen thousand to twenty thousand tons of ammunition and set it off.

On both sides there were successes and failures. A South Vietnamese regular battalion fought and won a grim hand-to-hand battle among the houses on the outskirts of Tam Ky, the capital of Quang Tin Province, on the night of September 4. Under cover of mortar and rocket fire, the attackers broke through the gate of the battalion command post and were driven back in a pitched battle by government troops using knives, bayonets, boots, and fists. The next day, units of the 5th Marines operating north of Tam Ky had a heavy engagement with two battalions from the 2nd North Vietnamese Division. Vietnamese Rangers and the 1st Brigade of the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

101st Airborne Division joined the fight in succeeding days, and there were high hopes that the 2nd NVA Division would pay for what seemed the folly of having incautiously concentrated its forces. But predictably, when the net closed the 2nd Division had slipped away.

Now it was Con Thien's turn again. Intelligence reported a major North Vietnamese buildup, estimated at two regiments, in the Demilitarized Zone, and again the B-52s filled the role of attack bombers. "They can take out a map square [in this case, a square kilometer] in one raid," an intelligence officer told me. "I'm sure they've broken the attack." He spoke too soon. As the rain clouds swept over the coast, the Northern troops probed the defenses at Con Thien and tried to cut the wire with mortar and rocket fire, at the same time maintaining a heavy barrage on troop positions. In three days, September 19 to 21, the Marines lost twenty-three killed and 317 wounded.

As the daily communiqués point out, nearly half of all American wounded are returned to duty without hospitalization and of those hospitalized more than two-thirds later return to duty. This explanation is certainly needed to counteract the shock of the casualty statistics: the Marines, with twenty-two battalions plus supporting troops, lost 2,299 men killed in action between January 1 and September 30 and reported 20,300 wounded.

The enemy's casualties are much higher. They have been losing steadily almost two thousand men a month, and this count does not include bombing casualties, those who are dragged away, or those who die of wounds. The enemy's morale, nevertheless, remains high. "Charlie's worth his salt," a Marine officer said. "He's well-disciplined and well-equipped. He knows his job. We don't see any kids fighting with them around here. These men are soldiers."

A Lesson Ignored

It is impossible to know or even to guess the gravity of the problems that confront the Northern command. It may be, as some competent observers in Saigon believe, that Giap will not be able to resume the effort on anything like the present scale when the monsoons have passed and serious campaigning becomes possible in this area in February. To attempt to assess Giap's own reaction to the results of the campaign is also to venture into the unknown, although to judge from captured documents he is likely to be sorely disappointed that the frontier of North Vietnam has not been pushed farther south. This is one of the credits, as is the Marines' fortitude.

The situation is cause, nevertheless, for genuine concern. The Marines are in a dilemma of their own contriving. They must either stay put in Gio Linh and Con Thien and expect heavy punishment, or they must pull back and take a significant defeat. Neither is acceptable. One can only wonder at the military thinking that lay behind the decision to establish fixed outposts within artillery range of the North Vietnamese. That the Northern troops had no artillery worth the name a year ago is no excuse. After all, the Vietminh had no artillery when the French put themselves down in Dien Bien Phu. If any lesson came out of the Indo-China War, it was that targets produce the weapons required to attack them. Con Thien and Gio Linh leave no room for forward maneuver. If the main positions had been established south of Quang Tri city and the area to the north had been kept under constant surveillance by ground patrol, the casualty rate would have been lower and the tactical situation could scarcely have failed to be better than it is now.

Nor can one have much faith in the future of the McNamara Line, which is supposed to follow the Gio Linh-Con Thien axis. Many of the electronic burglar-alarm devices can be dropped from the air. But if the Marines within the shelter of their bunkers and foxholes are so vulnerable to mortar and artillery fire, what chance do the engineers have of clearing the strip to the west of Con Thien, where the mountains begin, and of building the fences and laying the minefields that go with the burglar alarm? It is possible to build such a line, for what it may be worth, but not within range of the guns in the Demilitarized Zone without incurring losses that would invalidate the concept.

OF MORE SIGNIFICANCE in the future than the situation on this highly active front is the state of the rear in I Corps. With the exception of Quang Ngai, which received a respite in June when the 2nd Division of the North Vietnamese Army concentrated in Quang Tin, the situation has never been worse. Areas under government control have shrunk. Pacification has become meaningless, and even regions hitherto considered proof against penetration have begun to slip. "We ought to know by this time that pacification is never going to work within sound of artillery fire," one of the most experienced counterinsurgency specialists said last month. "Unless we can keep Charlie beyond artillery range, there will not only be no security but no security of mind, either. And when it comes to pacification, that is one of the key factors." If there are people in I Corps today living far enough from the war not to hear the constant sound of artillery fire, they must be deep in areas under Vietcong control.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Louise Day Hicks Gets Out the Vote

MARTIN NOLAN

BOSTON

IN THEIR September 26 preliminary election, Bostonians nominated the most racially regressive candidate for mayor to emerge in a large Northern city, rejected the record of the best mayor the city has had since Josiah Quincy left office in 1829, and passed up a chance to nominate an even better mayor. Boston is a city that has often wrestled with the best traditions of its past and the best hopes for its future; occasionally it has discarded both and survived. This time, however, the depressing results can only be explained as an example of an increasingly urgent problem facing many American cities—the discontent of middle-class whites who feel neglected by City Hall and threatened by the rising political power of urban Negroes. Backlash, the election confirmed, is a sad reality in Boston, and it could end the city's venture in reform government.

In a ten-way nonpartisan election, Boston's citizens chose two candidates for mayor: Louise Day Hicks, a member of the Boston School Committee, whose recent career in politics has been devoted to defense of "the neighborhood school" and thinly veiled disparagements of Boston's Negroes; and Kevin H. White, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, an honorific job to which he has been elected four times. White, thirty-eight years old, is a handsome and honorable man, but his interest in city affairs has been more recently acquired than his ambition to be governor.

On November 7 one of the two will be elected to succeed Mayor John F. Collins, who was elected in 1959, when Boston's economy and civic spirit were at a low ebb. Collins pushed through various reforms and economies, along with the most ambitious big-city urban-renewal program in the country which, under planner Edward J. Logue, has garnered more than $200 million in Federal money for the city. Since many of these changes aroused hostility among the electorate, Collins has met the fate of many other mayors who have tried for higher office. When he ran for the U.S. Senate last year, he was badly beaten in the Democratic primary, receiving only 37.9 per cent of the vote in his own city. His more recent hope, that Logue, one of the ten candidates in the preliminary, would become his successor and carry forward the banner of reform, was not fulfilled either. Next semester Collins will become professor of urban affairs at MIT.

SO FAR, Louise Day Hicks has conducted an unobtrusive campaign for mayor. No billboards and only a few radio and television announcements advertise her candidacy. Like George Wallace of Alabama, she relies on an easily decipherable code. "You know where I stand," she tells crowds, and they all cheer. Like Wallace, Mrs. Hicks proclaims that she has never uttered an anti-Negro statement in her life, but a typical campaign speech makes unmistakable associations:

"I am a candidate for mayor because I am alarmed that I, as a woman, can no longer walk the streets in safety. I am alarmed to see lifelong Bostonians moving out of Boston in disgust. I am alarmed to see public education geared to busmobiles rather than bookmobiles. I am alarmed to see rioters causing damage to property, injuring our police and firemen, and escaping any form of punishment. I am in favor of civil rights for all, but I cannot favor preferential rights for some over others. . . . Under my administration, the parks, streets, and subways of Boston will no longer be jungles of lawlessness. . . . I can reduce welfare costs by putting able-bodied welfare recipients to work. . . . I hope you will join me in a return to true democracy, to a government which will serve all of the people all of the time. I believe in the people of Boston."

Such a discourse may mean different things to different people, but its most common inference was drawn one recent evening in Haley and McGuire's, a saloon in the Dorchester district at the fringe of the Roxbury slums. The consensus was articulated several times: "I'll vote

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for her because she'll keep the colored in their place."

Mrs. Hicks's strength lies with Boston's middle-class whites, who feel that their governments, their churches, their newspapers have abandoned them in the rush of concern over the problems of the slums. Their frustration has increased in proportion to the growing energy of black power and the demands of Negroes, who compose thirteen per cent of Boston's population.

Mrs. Hicks received 43,719 votes in the preliminary election—less than thirty per cent of the 156,928 cast. She ran strongest where government—mostly in Federally financed programs of greatest benefit to the suburbs—was either doing nothing for neighborhoods or was destroying them. In Italo-American East Boston, where airport expansion has taken homes, and in the North End, Boston's "Little Italy," which has been cut off from the rest of the city by a giant interstate highway, she did very well. West Roxbury and Jamaica Plain, both comfortable neighborhoods where many insurance executives live, are unthreatened by Negroes but threatened by another highway, which will speed suburbanites to Dedham and Dover; Mrs. Hicks came in first in these areas. She ran poorly, however, in the Negro areas of Roxbury and the South End, where public housing and urban-renewal programs have been concentrated. She ran even more poorly in the apartments and town houses of the Back Bay and Beacon Hill, whose residents enjoy the prime fruits of the city's economy. But these four areas contain only 57,320 of Boston's 270,000 voters.

The Rising Star

Mrs. Hicks has not led opinion in her city but followed it. When she first ran for office in 1961, she campaigned as a liberal and a reformer with a goal of "taking politics out of the School Committee." The daughter of a well-known judge and herself a lawyer and a Democrat, she was one of four new members elected to the five-member board that year. Her early political career followed a familiar pattern—a "neighborhood" candidate running first for a minor city office, then seeking one of the many ceremonial county and state offices that clutter the Massachusetts ballot.

Mrs. Hicks was quiet and noncontroversial in her first term, devoting much of her time to praising principals, teachers, and "our dedicated custodial staff." She evinced interest in "compensatory education" for Negro children and asked Negro leaders in Roxbury for advice and support. Several of these leaders, as well as a major citizens' reform group, considered endorsing Mrs. Hicks for re-election after she had been chosen chairman of the School Committee early in 1963. Then, on

June 11, the Boston NAACP met with the School Committee to discuss a wide range of grievances.

The confrontation produced some agreement until the NAACP asked the School Committee to acknowledge the existence of *de facto* segregation in the schools. Mrs. Hicks and a majority of the School Committee refused, claiming that such an admission would place political blame on the school system for social conditions wrought by housing and employment policies. The NAACP then walked out and called for a one-day boycott of the schools and picketing of School Committee headquarters. The argument over the two small Latin words continued throughout the summer against a national backdrop of civil-rights advances.

Mrs. Hicks allowed another meeting between the NAACP and the School Committee on August 6, but she quickly ended discussion of the matter at hand, saying, "There is no *de facto* segregation in Boston's schools. Kindly proceed to educational matters." The NAACP delegation again walked out in anger and despair; Mrs. Hicks walked into the role of a kind of folk heroine. In the election that November, she conducted a low-key campaign but won with 128,358 votes, far more than for anyone elese on the ballot.

In 1964, Mrs. Hicks ran for state Treasurer. Although defeated in the primary by the incumbent, another Boston Democrat, she carried the city handily. The next year saw increased civil-rights activity throughout the nation, and in Massachusetts an attempt to overcome the instransigence of the Boston School Committee. The state Commissioner of Education, with leading private citizens—including Richard Cardinal Cushing—prepared a report, "Because It Is Right—Educationally," that denounced racial imbalance in the schools and called for legislation to end it. Mrs. Hicks called the report "pompous pronouncements of the uninformed." But the legislature passed the law, which provided for the withholding of state aid from school systems that took no action to alleviate racially imbalanced classrooms. Though Boston was deprived of $6.3 million in state aid because of the School Committee's defiance of the law and though the education of white as well as Negro pupils has suffered as a consequence, Mrs. Hicks's political star has been rising steadily.

Mrs. Hicks answers questions in a crisp computer style, with frequent references to busses and neighborhood schools. If asked to define today's major campaign issue in Boston, she immediately answers, "The alienated voter." This riposte is a thrust at Collins, whose 1959 upset victory was analyzed by several Boston University professors in a brilliant book, *The Alienated Voter*. Collins promised reform during that election and afterward delivered it. But the "alienated voter" in 1959 was essentially voting against the entrenched politicians rather than for the unknown Collins and his program. The same motives may

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now benefit Mrs. Hicks. The September 26 vote for her was a signal coming in strong over most of the city: whoever wins in November, Boston's attempt at reform may have heard its last hurrah.

The Reform Years

Reform came to Boston in 1951 with a new charter that established a city council elected at large. The intention was to eliminate the pressure of neighborhood influence on City Hall, but in the process the city also discouraged neighborhood hopes and undermined neighborhood faith in city government—in the evil days of James Michael Curley, they at least got some local parks and playgrounds. After years of corrupt administrations, the reformers gave fiscal austerity a high priority. The city cut school budgets, reduced the number of police stations, and repaired streets and collected garbage more efficiently but less frequently. Competition from the suburbs and the indifference of Federal and state goverments threatened the city with an economic crisis. Before the administration of Mayor Collins began to turn the tide, Boston had lost nearly two hundred thousand people.

With the neighborhoods thus alienated and restless, the issue of schools needed little help from bigotry or Mrs. Hicks to become a focal point of middle-class discontent. The man in Dorchester making $8,000 a year read of educational innovation in the suburbs and of the very poor schooling received by Negro children in Roxbury, but read nothing of the schooling his own children received, which was poor enough by most standards. When bussing was proposed as one of the means to achieve the integration ordered by the state, it seemed to the neighborhoods that the one remaining virtue of the public school—its closeness—was to be taken away.

The brightest spot in the record of reform in Boston has been urban renewal under Edward Logue. Logue's candidacy was *sui generis* in local politics: he was probably the only Yale graduate ever to run for mayor of Boston. Logue came here in 1960 after making a brilliant record and national reputation for rebuilding downtown New Haven under Mayor Richard C. Lee. He revived Boston with large injections of imagination and Federal funds. He turned down renewal jobs in New York and Washington to make his first try for elective office "because I love this city." Logue's opponents denounced him as an "intruder," but several of them conceded privately that he was by far the best-qualified candidate. He also represented

the best hope for continuation of Boston's upward surge.

Although Logue's most spectacular successes are evident in the downtown skyline, his "planning with people" concept of urban renewal will probably remain as his monument. This concept allowed renewal only when neighborhood groups wanted it and to their specifications, and he sold it by personal appeals over kitchen tables. His planning with people, however, had begun with the most needy—the Negroes. Logue came in first in only one ward, the Negro Washington Park section of Roxbury, where the largest neighborhood program had been taking place.

Logue finished fourth, fifty-three votes behind a Republican state representative, John Winthrop Sears, whose thoughtful, well-researched campaign was run by assistants to Governor John A. Volpe. Anxious to enhance the governor's national reputation with a strong Republican showing in an eight-to-one Democratic city, the Sears supporters conducted an extensive, expensive advertising campaign concentrating on neighborhood problems. Sears and Logue cut into each other's vote throughout the city, ruining each other's chances.

Kevin White, with 30,497 votes, found support throughout the city. Unidentified with any major issue, he probably drew his strength from his frequent appearances on the Democratic ballot and from the fact that his father, grandfather, and father-in-law had been prominent in Boston politics.

Now Bostonians of both parties who see a Hicks administration as a disaster will rally around White and claim for him qualities of leadership and sagacity. Governor Volpe and Senator Edward M. Kennedy have already announced support, but this could backfire, providing Mrs. Hicks with the slogan that no one loves her but the people. White has issued serious position papers on the city's problems, but in his own speeches he has stuck to his billboard theme, "You Become Important When Kevin White Is Mayor." The only apparent reason for this declaration is that the mayor himself might become less important. As more and more political figures climb aboard his bandwagon, more clearly identifying him with the powers from which the middle class feels alienated, White must face a crucial decision: will he confront Mrs. Hicks directly and in detail on the one big issue in the campaign?

ON PAPER, White seems secure. More than seventy per cent of those voting in the preliminary election did not vote for Mrs. Hicks. But then the vote was widely scattered. To attack Mrs. Hicks directly is a perilous business, as two candidates discovered on September 26. City Councilor Peter F. Hines said that she had "a hate-thy-neighbor policy." He finished ninth with 1,103 votes. School Committeeman John J. McDonough had billboards saying "To Vote Mrs. Hicks Is to Ask for Violence." He finished tenth in the ten-way race with 812 votes. White somehow must change many minds among the 128,358 Bostonians who voted for Mrs. Hicks in 1963, knowing where she stood. If he runs the risk of creating a martyr, White also faces the danger of letting his opponent's conscience-soothing euphemisms go unchallenged—and right into her inaugural address.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Corporate Conservation of College Resources



Never harvest without replanting. That's sound thinking for the farmer and for the forester. And it makes sense for America's businessmen, too. That's why they "invest" annually in the nation's private colleges represented by the state and regional associations.

Successful businessmen know that 89% of the current crop of key business executives attended college. Of this college-trained group, 62% attended independent (non-tax-supported) colleges and universities. That's why company owners, directors and officers are making a sound business decision when they vote corporate funds as contributions to private higher education.

Selecting specific private colleges for business donations can involve precious hours of executive time and talent. Thousands of industrial organizations, from corporate giants to the small businessman, contribute through the broadest-based and most efficient method — the state associations of independent colleges.

The state group method involves 39 associations of colleges from Maine to California, from Florida to Washington State. They channel voluntary contributions to their more than 500 member institutions. You may give through one or all, and your gift will be handled as you direct or distributed according to a formula agreed upon by the participating colleges.

Among the hundreds of institutions participating in this cooperative endeavor are some of the oldest and finest in the nation — St. John's College (1696), *Washington and Lee University* (1749), *Dartmouth* College (1769) and Union College (1785). For further information on this effective and businesslike method of aiding your company, your community and your country — write the Independent College Funds of America, 7004 Empire State Building, New York, New York 10001.

ICFA

INDEPENDENT COLLEGE FUNDS OF AMERICA, INC.

7004 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10001

REPRESENTING THE 39 ASSOCIATIONS OF COLLEGES AND THEIR MORE THAN 500 PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Most ships used to pump oil overboard every time they cleaned their tanks. Then Jersey Standard put in a system to keep this oil out of the sea. Other tanker fleets followed suit. Now a major source of water pollution is almost gone. And a lot of oil is being saved in the bargain.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The last thing you want to strike when you go to the beach is oil.

But too often that's just where you find it. It might have come from a sunken wreck. Or an underwater oil formation. Or most likely from a ship at sea.

In 1964, the chances of its coming from a tanker went way down. And Jersey Standard had a lot to do with it.

Previously, when a tanker cleaned its cargo tanks (or any ship cleaned its fuel tanks), it took in seawater, sloshed it around, and ended up dumping a mixture of oil and water overboard.

This was standard practice. International regulations permitted it so long as it was done far from shore. The amount of oil carried by sea was a lot less than it is now. So the problem wasn't too serious.

But in the last fifteen years the volume of tanker-borne oil has more than tripled. That's why Jersey, with other oil companies, developed a new system to handle mixtures of oil and water.

It's called the load-on-top method. After the tanks are cleaned, the oil and water are separated by adding a chemical developed by Jersey Standard. Only the clean water is pumped overboard. The oil stays behind. In the tanks.

The next load of oil goes right on top of the oil in the tanks. Then, the whole cargo is pumped off at the next port of call.

Jersey tankers—all 126 of them—use the load-on-top method. So do most other major oil and tanker companies around the world—with the result that oil pumped overboard is down 95 percent. And a lot of oil is saved in the bargain.

All of which pleases Jersey. Not to speak of the beach lovers. The birds. And the fish.

STANDARD OIL COMPANY (New Jersey)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



With the first three printings of *Vietnam: Why* sold out, and orders for the book still coming in at a fast rate, The Reporter has gone back on press to print a fourth edition.

Vietnam: Why has proved, evidently, most useful to those who want to have an understanding of the situation in that country—as it affects the United States, Southeast Asia, indeed, the world. Such an understanding *is essential to all responsible Americans.*

The confusion... the dissension... the *emotions* which surround the war led us to prepare the backgrounder report—*Vietnam: Why.*

Vietnam: Why traces the history of our increasing participation in the war through a compilation of pivotal articles by Denis Warner, Richard C. Hottelet, Philip Geyelin, Takashi Oka, Douglas Pike, Stanley Andrews, and Victor Bator.

In 1965 and 1966, THE REPORTER and Max Ascoli, as editor, and Denis Warner, as correspondent, were cited by The Overseas Press Club for "best reporting from abroad" and "best interpretation of foreign affairs." Much of that coverage was on Southeast Asia. Much of it is published in *Vietnam: Why.*

There are articles on China, the N.L.F., Thailand, the young generals, the refugee problem, the Ho Chi Minh trial, the Buddhists, the Geneva Agreements. Plus Max Ascoli's editorials spelling out THE REPORTER'S position.

Vietnam: Why is a book worth owning—REPORTER size (8¾ by 11 inches), containing 64 pages. There is a special foreword and section identifying the writers. In all, you will find 15 articles plus six editorials in *Vietnam: Why.*

Here is a book that will serve you well as a reference. In fact, it is a book you might well want to give to friends who, too, are seeking more information than is available in the daily press or newsweeklies.

Order your copy *today.* You will be very glad you did.

Clip and mail today

THE REPORTER,
660 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10021

Send me_____copies of *Vietnam: Why* at just $1 each. My payment is enclosed. (If you order 10 or more copies, deduct 10% per copy.)

Name_____

Address_____

City_____State_____Zip____

THE REPORTER, 660 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10021

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



By Fernando Krahn

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The Case for the Tax Surcharge

HERBERT STEIN

THE NEW ECONOMICS and the old Puritan ethic have converged this fall to recommend a tax increase. The New Economics says that when inflation is forecast, taxes should be raised, and inflation is now commonly forecast. The Puritan ethic holds that when the Federal budget is going to be in deficit, taxes should be raised to balance it, and this year the Federal budget is going to be in substantial deficit. Even so, the President's proposal to levy a ten per cent surcharge on individual and corporate income taxes is in trouble. The odds are that there will be a tax increase, but that it will come later than the President wished, be smaller than he asked, and require him to pay more in expenditure cuts than he would like.

The difficulties that the President's tax proposal have encountered should have been no surprise. Increases of the Federal income tax are very rare. Except for the special case of 1932, there have been general increases only during the two World Wars and the Korean War. Relative to the Federal budget and the national income, even the Korean War was much larger than the current conflict. And in all three of those wars the Presidents had to settle for smaller increases than they wanted. The plain fact was and is that people do not like to have their taxes raised.

The modern standard view of fiscal history does not prepare us for the difficulties in the way of the tax increase. This view teaches that before 1963 the country was dominated by the idea that the budget should be balanced—if not always, at least almost always. But in 1963 we were converted by the New Economists to the view that taxes should be reduced when expert analysis and prognosis indicate a deficiency of total demand and should be raised in the contrary circumstances. This conversion led to the tax reduction of 1964. If the conversion had lasted, there would be no problem about raising taxes now when the economists warn of inflation. And even if the country or Congress has retrogressed to the budget-balancing idea, that should be an equally powerful force for raising taxes in 1967.

BUT THIS VIEW of the history greatly exaggerates both the force of budget balancing as a guide to policy before 1963 and the extent of the conversion to the notion that the economics profession could tell us reliably how to manipulate taxes to produce high employment, price stability, and steady growth.

The 1963-1964 tax fight was not a contest between budget balancing and the flexible use of taxation as a stabilizer. The fight was over expenditures. Before the House of Representatives voted on the tax cut, President Kennedy sent up a letter promising a tight budget for the next fiscal year. Then Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, delivered a powerful speech to persuade the House that in voting for tax reduction it would be voting for restraints on expenditures that would make possible more tax cuts later. The Senate would not act on the tax cut until it saw the budget for the following year. When President Johnson sent up a surprisingly small budget in January, 1964, he promptly got the tax cut.

This is the background against which the tax increase is being considered. It is a background of little confidence in expert advice, only marginal devotion to the principle of the balanced budget, a general reluctance to raise taxes, and a feeling of disappointment and resentment that Congress is faced with this choice after the expectations created during the discussion of the 1964 tax cut. Presidents can sometimes override these difficulties, but Mr. Johnson's leadership is less powerful than it once was. A war would ordinarily be sufficient to assure some increase in taxes, but the Vietnam War is special, and its influence works against as well as for the proposal. Therefore, Congress is in a mood and position to bargain hard

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

before granting the President a tax increase.

Administration Arguments

The case for raising taxes, as presented by the administration, rests on three points:

Inflation. During the latter part of 1965 and most of 1966, the U.S. economy was under strong inflationary pressure. Rising expenditures for the Vietnam War, added to the vigorous upswing already in progress, caused the total demand for output to rise faster than could be matched by the supply, even though production rose substantially. The average rate of price increase, which had been running around one to 1.5 per cent a year, rose to three or 3.5 per cent.

In the first half of 1967 the economy entered a period of lull. This was mainly due to a drastic decline in the rate at which businesses were building up inventories. The slowdown was also due to tight monetary conditions, caused in part by the Federal Reserve's efforts to curb the inflation. Probably to a smaller degree, the government's action in suspending the tax credit for business investment also contributed to the pause in the economy.

The pause is expected to be temporary, and indeed may already have ended. The decline in the rate of inventory investment, which was the main element in the pause, can hardly go much further and will probably turn into a rise. The relaxation of credit conditions has produced the beginnings of an increase in residential construction. Meanwhile government spending, defense and nondefense, state and local as well as Federal, continues to grow. By 1968, recovery of the economy will give a boost to investment spending by business. And the increased income resulting from increases in all these lines of activity will accelerate consumer spending. So by the end of 1967 the growth of total demand will again exceed the growth of production and prices will rise more rapidly.

People complain about being asked to pay higher taxes on top of high and rising prices. But the taxes will not be in addition to higher prices; they will be a substitute for higher prices. Failure to raise taxes would leave more money in our pockets, but the larger amount of money would not buy more. Real consumption and investment, the administration insists, must and will be held down to real production in some way, and if that is not done by higher taxes it will be done by higher prices. The tax route is fairer, or can be made so, because we can decide who pays the taxes. The inflation route imposes the sacrifices mainly on the weak.

Tight Money. Advocates of a tax increase recognize that the predicted inflation could be checked by a tight-money policy, but they argue that this would simply make for higher interest rates, which in turn chiefly penalize small business, state and local governments, and, most severely, purchasers of houses, builders, and construction workers. Such an allocation of the sacrifice would be unfair and economically disruptive.

To this argument some add another which is, or sounds, even more ominous, namely, a recurrence of the financial "crunch" of 1966. The rise of interest rates in money markets, including rates on Federal securities, led many individuals holding savings and loan association shares, and corporations holding time deposits at banks, to take their money out and invest it directly. There was a danger that the financial institutions would be unable to meet the drain of funds if it continued, or at least be unable to meet the drain without liquidating assets at a loss. Financial markets in 1966 were, it is said, as near panic as at any time since the Second World War. However, the Federal Reserve and other financial agencies of the government came to the rescue and relieved the situation. Some advocates of a tax increase fear that without it the "crunch" would be repeated, but this time if the Federal Reserve is fighting a strong inflation it would be unable to relieve the financial markets as well.

The Budget Deficit. Economists who argue for the tax increase are likely first to swear that they haven't the slightest concern about the budget deficit "as such," and that the deficit is relevant only as, together with a lot of other conditions, it throws light on the problem of inflation and interest rates. However, President Johnson is not bucking for appointment to the Harvard Economics Department. He has not hesitated to appeal to what is left of the Puritan ethic in this country and invoke the size of the prospective deficit as an independent reason for raising taxes. In fact, he and his aides have presented the deficit picture in the most dramatic possible light.

There are several ways of defining and measuring the Federal budget, and these different ways show different surpluses or deficits. In his January Budget Message the President made a point of emphasizing what is called the National Income Accounts Budget, which is generally recognized to have much greater economic significance than the traditional Administrative Budget and usually has a smaller deficit. But in the argument for the tax increase this summer and fall, the President and his officials have talked almost exclusively in terms of the Administrative Budget. This has enabled them to talk about a deficit of $25 to $29 billion, rather than the $15 to $18 billion apparently in prospect in the National Income Accounts Budget if there is no tax increase.

Grounds for Doubt

The Congressmen who express reluctance to raise taxes don't deny what the supporters say; they only complain that the administration has not made its case. In particular, they express reservations about the administration's forecasts and about forecasting in general.

The economic case the supporters have to make is indeed a hard one. They must show not only that the economy will be rising but also that the rise will exceed some critical rate that causes serious inflation. If the forecast is wrong by any significant amount, so is their recommendation. There is little margin for error.

The forecasting basis of the 1963-1964 tax-cut proposal was quite different. Then the economy was running about $30 to $40 billion below its potential annual output, and had been doing so most of the time for five years. The tax cut was justified not by the forecast of a change but by the forecast of no change in the economy. Furthermore, it was ex-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pected to close only part of the gap between desired and actual output, so that there was some margin for error before the tax cut would overshoot the mark and cause inflation. And it was to take effect gradually, over a period of a year and a half as originally proposed, so that there would be opportunity to correct for errors in the forecast if they became apparent.

PLENTY of reasons can be found for skepticism about the ability of economists to make such a precise forecast reliably. As Congressman Mills has reminded expert witnesses before his committee, the experts told Congress in the summer of 1957 that it was not a good time for a tax reduction. This was about one month before the 1957-1958 recession began, and in retrospect it looks as if a tax cut would have been most opportune. Economists made a similar error in 1960. To come much closer to the present, we may recall that after mid-1965 inadequate information on the pace of the Vietnam buildup led to a serious underestimate of its inflationary impact. Also, the administration's request for suspension of the investment credit in September, 1966, followed by a request for restoration of the credit within a few months, did not suggest that policy was guided by a very clear view of the future.

The administration's current recommendation that taxes should be raised to prevent inflation rests not only on the proposition that there would be inflation if taxes were not raised. It also rests on the proposition that the tax increase would stop —or substantially reduce—the inflation. On this proposition also there is skepticism in Congress, with eminent, although not widespread, support in the economics profession. What is at issue is whether a tax increase that is expected to be temporary will cause the taxpayers to reduce their spending or to reduce their saving. In the latter event there would be no anti-inflationary effect. The increase would simply reduce the government deficit and equally reduce the private saving that would have been invested in the government debt; everything else would remain unchanged. As for the effect on spending, some economists, notably Professor Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago, interpret the available evidence as showing that people adjust their spending to what they expect their income will be on the average in the long run, and that they respond to variations of income which they expect to be temporary by changing the amount they save. If this is true, it casts a great deal of doubt on the anti-inflation argument for a tax increase.

The tight-money argument for raising taxes depends upon the inflationary aspect of the case. If the forces in the economy do not add up to inflation in the absence of a tax increase, there will be no need for monetary tightness or higher interest rates. And if a tax increase will not restrain inflation, because it reduces private saving rather than spending, then a tax increase will not prevent tight money either. But there are other reasons for doubt about the tight-money argument. During the spring and summer of 1967, interest rates rose substantially in anticipation of government and private borrowing expected to come later. Present interest rates may be already adjusted to the conditions that would exist if there were no tax increase, so that there would be no further rise if the tax proposal were rejected. If so, a repetition of the "crunch" is unlikely. Anyway, a "crunch" is not the inevitable consequence of high or rising interest rates; it results from lack of preparation by private financial institutions and by governmental financial policy. To ask the American people to pay $8 or $9 billion in taxes to avoid this seems extreme to some economists.



As for the effect of tight money in restraining private investment, notably residential construction, this diversion of resources may be the best way to meet the expense of the Vietnam War, opponents of the tax increase say. It may be more sensible to defer part of the addition to our stock of capital, which can be made up later and which has little effect on current living standards, than to curtail consumption at once.

To complete the list of doubts, the size of the prospective deficit carries little weight as an independent reason for raising taxes. Even when we were much more devoted to balancing the budget than we are today, we did not expect to balance it during a war. And while the figures for the deficit are impressively large, so are all other dollar figures in the American economy. So goes the argument against the administration's proposal.

The Expenditure Argument

Still, the probabilities are on the side of the administration's short-run argument. The evidence that we would face serious inflation if taxes were not raised may not be overwhelming, but it is stronger than the evidence that we would have a recession if we did raise taxes. Moreover, after the inflationary episode of 1965-1966 it is probably time for us to lean in the direction of stopping inflation, even at some risk of slowing down the rise of production and employment. And one does not have to share the common fear of or bias against high interest rates to believe that it would be better to restrain the rise in the affluent level of American private consumption by raising taxes than to repress private investment by tight money. Moreover, if the argument is correct that a temporary tax increase does little to hold down private spending, it also means that the temporary tax increase can do little harm.

The point is not the absence of a case for raising taxes on grounds of short-run economic effects. It is rather that the arguments are not strong enough to compel the decision to be made in terms of short-run economic effects alone. Hence other consequences must also be considered and may dominate the decision.

The most important of these have to do with Federal expenditures and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the future of Federal taxes, and are believed to flow from two laws —one political and one economic. The political law is that the higher taxes are, the higher expenditures will be. The economic law is that even though higher expenditures do not necessarily require higher taxes in the short run and may not require higher taxes in 1967-1968, in the long run and on the average, the higher expenditures are, the higher taxes have to be. Therefore, the decision about taxes now is also a decision about expenditures and future taxes, and should be influenced by preferences about them.

BASICALLY, the Congressmen are saying that they want expenditures to be lower, not only this year but also over the longer term. Representative Mills wants to fulfill the promise and prophecy of a downward trend of taxes that he made in advocating the tax cut in 1963. Congress fears that if it gives the President the tax increase he asks now, spending will be higher than otherwise, not only now but also later. Indeed, Congressmen are highly skeptical of the idea that the proposed tax increase would in fact be temporary. They remember that many of the taxes that were supposed to expire automatically after the end of the Korean War were extended step by step for a decade, under the seemingly inexorable pressure of rising expenditures. They can foresee something like that happening again after the Vietnam War. They feel that the only sure way to make a tax increase temporary is not to enact it.

Congress is not terribly impressed with the risk of inflation if it doesn't raise taxes, and is impressed with the risk that expenditures and taxes will be permanently higher if it does. Because it evaluates the risks in this way, it is able to make a credible threat of refusing to raise taxes unless the President cuts expenditures. And because the threat is credible, and because the President wants some tax increase very much, he will make a strenuous effort to meet their demands. This would be a close parallel to events of 1963-1964 when Congress forced the President to cut expenditure by threatening not to enact the tax reduction.



The ranks of the perennial Congressional "economizers" will probably be joined today by some who are usually "spenders" but who now object violently to one particular expenditure—that for the war in Vietnam. They will oppose the tax increase to show their intense opposition to the war and also to make prosecution of the war more unpopular by preventing it from being financed in the best way. In either terms, the tactic seems unlikely to be very effective. Those who oppose the tax increase because they are against the war will hardly be visible in the crowd of people who oppose it for other reasons.

Whether refusal to raise taxes would increase the real cost of the war, by causing inflation or other adverse economic consequences, is a question we have already discussed and answered "Probably yes, although probably not much." For the anti-war people the more significant question is whether the public and the President will *think* the cost of the war is higher if taxes are not raised than if they are. For the public the answer is probably "No." For the President the answer is affirmative, but not so strongly as to influence his policy toward the war.

Then there are those who support the tax increase because they are all for the other war—the war on poverty, including even some who normally favor lower government spending. They may not regard the tax increase as the best of all possible alternatives. Some would prefer to hold down certain expenditures (agriculture, highways, the space program, and the supersonic transport are the common list), to manage the welfare programs more efficiently, and to rely on monetary restraint as necessary to prevent inflation. But this is a world in which we seldom get the best of all possible alternatives. Politics, prejudice, ignorance, and inertia in the budgetary process make niggardliness in the urban-poverty programs the more probable consequence of a failure to raise taxes.

This case for a tax increase is not an argument for throwing money around. It does not imply that spending money will cure all our social ills, or even avoid the necessity for making hard decisions. It does say that time cannot be stopped in America because a war is going on in Vietnam. At this point in time, it would be both unwise and dangerous to force extremely difficult decisions to be made within the confines of an unnecessarily stringent budget, through refusing to raise taxes or threatening to do so. In my opinion, this is the compelling reason for a tax increase.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Steady Decline Of New Delhi's Authority

SUNDAR RAJAN

CALCUTTA

ON A WARM, humid day last August, the 521-member Lok Sabha, the lower house of India's Parliament, debated the report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, a dull annual ritual. In due course, the opposition moved its traditional amendment to the official motion seeking approval of the document. Approval was, as always, taken for granted, but this time when the opposition amendment was put to a vote, to the amazement of the members it carried. The sudden two-vote defeat for the majority Congress Party, the first in the Lok Sabha since independence twenty years ago, was the result of poor attendance on the government benches.

Some opposition M.P.s danced in the aisles with cries of triumph. "We have waited for this day for two decades!" shouted a member of the Jana Sangh. The head of the Samyukta (United) Socialist Party, Madhu Limaye, appealed with folded hands to the grim-faced Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, "to bow out of power gracefully." The government's legal experts opined that the Prime Minister and the cabinet need not resign since the defeat was merely "technical." After some dismaying moments as stragglers were rounded up, the government succeeded in restoring the status quo by defeating the opposition amendment through a second motion as prescribed in May's *Parliamentary Practice*. Despite opposition talk of "moral rot in the ruling party," the crisis was over, and the bulk of the M.P.s drifted off to the coffee room.

This sense of unreality, of impending convulsion and easy revival, has been typical of Indian federal and state politics since last February's general election and the drastic reduction it brought in the power of the Congress Party. The world's most populous free nation (there are now 512 million Indians) has been moving these past several months from crisis to crisis, always somehow managing to retreat from the brink. The newspapers make gloomy reading: reports of strikes, threats of self-immolation, hunger marches, food riots, student demonstrations, and "direct action" by disaffected linguistic and religious groups fill their columns. Yet though a Communist boss told a workers' rally in Bombay that "The long-awaited revolution has already arrived" and a Samyukta leader stated that "The old order is finished and a determined push is all that is necessary to get rid of the so-called Congressist giant," Mrs. Gandhi told a New Delhi meeting of party workers that she saw no crisis of confidence either among the people or the leaders. "Some politicians and newspapers are simply exaggerating and distorting the picture," she claimed.

Easier Said

Though it retained a slender majority in the national Parliament, the Congress Party lost six of the sixteen states in the February elections. Since then, three more—Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Haryana—have voted out their Congress ministries after internal disruption in the party. Today, sixty-four per cent of Indians have come under opposition rule. (Even the holy Ganges no longer flows through any Congress-ruled area.) The loss of Uttar Pradesh, home of the Nehrus and the traditional recruiting ground for Prime Ministers, and of Madhya Pradesh, the country's biggest state, came as a heavy blow to Mrs. Gandhi and Congress Party Chairman Kumaraswami Kamaraj. Floor-crossing defections by legislators have become Kamaraj's biggest worry. A federal cabinet minister lamented to me, "We can no longer be sure of the loyalty of anyone. The Congress has become a party of opportunists and turncoats." Informed observers, however, say that the real threat posed by defectors when Parliament reconvenes for its winter session in November is not so much to the supremacy of the Congress Party as to the premiership of Mrs. Gandhi. In recent weeks, the whispering campaign on behalf of "strong man" Morarji Desai, the Deputy Prime Minister, has gathered momentum.

However, the more meaningful part of the Indian political drama is being enacted not in rumor-ridden New Delhi but in the states, particularly in those where Gandhian dissidents from the Congress Party, Communists, Socialists, conservatives, and Hindu nationalists have formed coalition governments. Hailing the election results last February, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, for decades a leading Congress Party figure before breaking away from Jawaharlal

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nehru to form the conservative Swatantra (Freedom) Party, described the role of the opposition-controlled states as "a base from which we should be able to converge on the capital." Eight months later, Rajagopalachari's aggressiveness seems to have waned. The major worry of the United Fronts in eight states (Madras in the south alone has a single-party opposition régime) is no longer how to capture federal power but how to keep their own coalitions from cracking up. In many ways, these crazy-quilt provincial governments are even more shaky than the Gandhi régime in New Delhi.

ACCORDING to Kamaraj, what banded the opposition parties together before the February election was not ideological cohesion but "spite" toward the Congress Party. Rajagopalachari, who masterminded the opposition victory in his home ground of Madras, said at that time: "The supreme task is to put the Congress in opposition. We can think of the next step later." This meant in effect a marriage of convenience between pro-Peking Communists, pro-Moscow Communists, free-enterprise Swatantraites, anti-Communist Socialists, right-wing Hindu nationalists, idealistic Gandhians, and Sikh and Moslem obscurantists. Realizing the strength of their deep-rooted differences and mutual suspicions, the coalition governments devised "minimum programs" that, they thought, could be implemented without much difficulty. These dealt with such essentials as tenant security in rural areas, elimination of governmental corruption, provision of cheap food and better housing, and security for religious and linguistic minorities. But in actual practice, all their energies have been consumed by the sheer struggle for survival. West Bengal in the northeast and Kerala in the far south, both dominated by the pro-Peking faction of the Communist Party, have run into particularly serious trouble.

Virtually a house divided against itself, the fourteen-party West Bengal government in Calcutta headed by Ajoy Mukherjee, an aging Gandhian, is just emerging from what has come to be known as the "Naxalbari fever." Last summer, taking advantage of their dominance in the provincial administration, the pro-Peking Reds in Naxalbari, barely sixty miles from Chinese-held Tibet, organized a rebellion by instigating the illiterate Santhal tribals to occupy government and private land, ambushing police parties with bows and arrows and crude guns and spreading a reign of terror. Peking Radio described it all as "the front paw of the Great Indian Revolution" and "the first glow of Chairman Mao's Thoughts on the Indian soil." Despite the outcry in Parliament and a plea from the Home Minister to act firmly, Chief Minister Mukherjee at first declined to order the state police to crush the rebels, evidently on the basis that any such action would enrage the dominant pro-Peking group in West Bengal's cabinet and bring down the coalition.

Only in late July, when pro-Peking ministers in the cabinet led by Deputy Chief Minister Jyoti Basu, a party stalwart known for his organizational abilities, realized that failure to act would put them all in the Indian political wilderness once again, did the state government send some 1,500 policemen into Naxalbari to dismantle the "parallel government." News had reached Basu and his supporters from New Delhi that the federal government was preparing to move the army into the troubled district and planned a Presidential take-over in Calcutta. Acting with opportunistic speed, the Communist Party of India (CPI) Marxists, as the Basu faction describes itself, denounced the Naxalbari revolt as an exercise in adventurism and expelled its ringleaders. Perhaps the expulsion was only meant to hoodwink Mukherjee and New Delhi, but the fact remains that more than four hundred Naxalbari rebels are now in jail awaiting possible trial.

A Divisive Triumph

An article by the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times of India* newspapers shows that the CPI Marxists had prepared for Naxalbari—there were to be similar revolts all over India if the experiment succeeded—ever since the Chinese invasion of northeast India in October, 1962. At that time Indian and Chinese Communists established close contacts in the wake of the confusion that followed the invasion. Many pro-Peking Communists in West Bengal and Assam took advantage of the Indian government's guerrilla-training program, receiving instruction from seasoned army officers in underground tactics. The Indian Communists, who, it appeared, had never expected to triumph in last February's elections in West Bengal, had planned to begin their armed insurrection in Naxalbari after the state's Congress Party was returned to power. After their victory, which came to the Communists as a stunning surprise, Basu and other "moderates" advised a modification of the Naxalbari project. Local hotheads reportedly overruled them and plunged ahead.

Deputy Chief Minister Basu's role in helping Ajoy Mukherjee to put down the Naxalbari rebellion may ultimately split the CPI Marxists into two factions, raising the number of Indian Communist groups to three. Meanwhile, in an attempt to demonstrate his enthusiasm for the party and his ideological fervor, Basu is busy whipping up a struggle against the federal government on the food issue. (West Bengal is chronically dependent on New Delhi for a substantial portion of its grain needs.) Protesting weakly, Mukherjee agreed to plans for a one-day *bundh* (general strike). Life in the great metropolis of Calcutta came to a standstill. As one columnist noted, "The Calcutta *bundh* was the first government-organized general strike in history."

In West Bengal's industrial areas, CPI unionists are also openly instigating workers to lay siege to factories and government property. In some cases, managerial personnel have been held prisoners in their offices for as long as 160 hours. There have been over two hundred mob attacks on freight and passenger trains and railway stations all over West Bengal. The food shortage and pent-up frustrations of the Bengali masses are evidently providing a sharp edge to the lawlessness, which is designed to impress the federal authorities with the power of the CPI Marxists. Basu has cleverly seen to it that the police interfere as little as possible in these anti-New Delhi outbursts. Chief Minister Mu-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

kherjee has taken a philosophical line. "How can I ask policemen to beat up hungry people" he asked. "It is for Mrs. Gandhi and Food Minister Jagjivan Ram to ensure adequate supplies of rice and wheat."

Nonetheless, Mukherjee reportedly told a cabinet subcommittee that "I have not become Chief Minister to hand over my beloved Bengal to the Communist Party," and political correspondents in Calcutta say that the Chief Minister is no longer under the "spell" of the suave and charming Basu. Moreover, other non-Communist partners in the West Bengal coalition have become increasingly critical of the Basu group's dominance. Samyukta Socialist Party Chairman S. M. Joshi has warned the CPI Marxists "to behave or get out." The Samyukta Socialist Party has also threatened to pull out of the West Bengal and Kerala administrations if the Reds persist in their "disruptive tactics," and Mukherjee has now overruled some of Basu's ministerial decisions by which Communists infiltrated the administrative apparatus.

These developments figured prominently in a recent ten-day secret conference of the CPI Marxists held in the southern town of Madurai. Evidently the pro-Peking leaders felt that some of their number had gone a bit too far. The conference rejected the Chinese theory of armed revolution in India as "incorrect" and as "not tallying with our own experience." At the same time, it underlined the importance of "parliamentary and extra-parliamentary struggles in a correct combination" and expressed the opinion that the coalition governments in the states "must be treated as instruments of struggle in the hands of our people." In effect, the Madurai conclave tried both to erase the notion that the CPI Marxists are pawns of Peking and to reassure the Naxalbari elements (whose tactics have a growing appeal among younger members, particularly university students and factory workers) that the party has not lost its revolutionary fervor.

Who'll Hold the Bag?

Though the Madurai conference obliquely criticized Sankaran Namboodiripad, the Marxist Communist Chief Minister of Kerala State, for his lack of dynamism, observers say that this southern politician, who was once an ardent Gandhian, may be emerging as the real exponent of "parliamentary Communism." Mindful of the experiences of 1959 when overzealousness brought about the fall of Kerala's first Communist régime through federal intervention, Namboodiripad is proceeding cautiously. He has kept the non-Communists in his cabinet in good humor by following a pragmatic policy, including encouragement to leading northern industrialists to invest in Kerala. His Moslem League and Socialist partners are constantly placated. While quietly strengthening the Marxist base through a network of "people's committees" in rural areas and by recruiting fellow travelers to the civil service and the police, Namboodiripad has resisted extremist attempts to dictate to him. He has also exploited the popular feeling among Keralans that the federal authorities are meting out "step-motherly" treatment to their state in the matter of allocation of Five-Year Plan funds and shares from the federal taxation pool. Though there have been some state government-inspired demonstrations against New Delhi, Namboodiripad has let it be known that he is not in favor of the West Bengal type of unrest.

Nonetheless, Keralans are reportedly undergoing a creeping disenchantment with their Communist-dominated régime. As in West Bengal, the economy has shown no signs of improvement despite Communist claims to efficient administration. The New Delhi *Statesman* has noted, "Allegations of corruption are as widespread as under Congress Party rule, the only difference being that the corruption is now stated to be at the party level and not at the personal level." (No one in India denies that Indian Communists are personally incorruptible.) There are reports of diversion of public funds to the coffers of the CPI Marxists and of growing Communist interference in the administration. Police officials who are not "approved" by the Marxist members of "people's committees" are either suspended or transferred to other centers.

But neither the federal government nor the West Bengal and Kerala units of the Congress Party seem anxious to topple the United Front administrations. There are two reasons for this. First, they are not sure of popular backing. The average Bengali or Keralan seems to be averse to the idea of renewed Congress Party rule or direct administration by the President, as provided in the Constitution. Memories of twenty years of Congress misrule continue to be fresh. Second, the Congress Party entertains a lurking hope that time will work against the Communists. A former Congress Chief Minister of Kerala told a rally in Trivandrum, the state capital: "The people should not permit the Namboodiripad coalition to quit. If necessary, we must surround the Government Secretariat to force the ministry to remain in power for the full term of five years. We must challenge them to implement their promises to the people and not allow them to run away like cowards." His implied expectation is that the CPI will not be able to show any worthwhile results. Noting the economic stagnation in Kerala, a writer in the *Times of India* wrote: "Historians say that revolutions often tend to devour their own children. In Kerala, are the children of the revolution reversing the process by devouring the revolution itself?" And one cynical Congress Party M.P. told me in New Delhi: "The Communists must be fools if they think that they can ever clean up the mess we left behind!"

Of the seven other opposition-ruled provincial governments, Madras alone seems to be stable. The coalitions in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Haryana are as uneasy as their partners are ideologically disparate. The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Charan Singh, a Congress rebel, has managed to keep his cabinet from breaking up by periodically threatening to quit; the ruling parties in Madhya Pradesh are held together by a strong-willed woman, Princess Vijaya Raje, another defector from the Congress Party; the right-wing régimes in Punjab and Orissa have fared slightly better in terms of stability, but they are dominated by feudal and conservative forces and accomplish little for the masses.

Madras, home of the ancient Tam-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

il civilization, is the only state where an opposition ruling party has met with enthusiasm. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (League for the Advancement of the Dravidian People) commands a massive majority in the state legislature and has a dedicated leadership. The DMK had proclaimed in its election manifesto that its first achievement would be the provision of cheap rice to the people. "Our salary bills will not be encashed till we reduce the price of rice which went beyond the reach of the poor man because of the evil deeds of the Congress Party," its leader, Anna Durai, promised. This pledge has now been fulfilled to an appreciable extent. During a trip to Madras I noted that Durai, now Chief Minister, is phenomenally popular with the Tamils; they flock to his meetings by the thousands. Anna, as he is affectionately known, keeps his audiences spellbound. "Listening to Anna is even more interesting than seeing one of those melodramatic, tear-jerking films scripted by him," said an admiring university lecturer, referring to Durai's former occupation.

The DMK no longer talks in terms of an independent Tamil state; observers in Madras say that power has had a sobering effect on the Tamil extremists who only two years ago were publicly burning copies of the Indian constitution. But Durai is doing everything possible to convince the thirty-three million Tamils—and New Delhi—that he intends to de-Aryanize the southern state, always suspicious of the Aryan and politically more influential North. In a dramatic and unchallenged act of symbolic defiance of the federal government (some pundits say of the constitution), the DMK adopted a Tamil version of the Sankrit national motto, *"Satyameva Jayate"* ("Truth Alone Will Triumph"). Madras has also given a stern warning to New Delhi that it is against the adoption of Hindi, the northern Sanskritic language, as the sole federal administrative link. The state's Education Minister bluntly told his federal counterpart: "So far as we are concerned, the only two languages we recognize are Tamil and English."

After skillfully using the Communists to climb to power, Durai has cracked down on their troublemakers in Tanjore, Coimbatore, and other agrarian areas. A DMK official told me: "If the Reds try any of their Naxalbari tactics here, we will just send them to West Bengal. The Tamils have no need for Communism or capitalism. Tamil culture with its two-thousand-year-old books on morals is enough for us." Durai and his men have also quietly discarded—at any rate this is the impression they give—the atheistic beliefs that were characteristic of the DMK's philosophy before it came to power. As one Tamil politician put it: "This is a deeply religious country, and the surest way to bring Kamaraj's men back to power is to decry God."



'A Hundred Flowers'

The capture of administrative power by disparate opposition groups in nine of the sixteen states is steadily undermining whatever "Indianness" there was in Indian polity. There was little interstate co-operation even when the Congress Party ruled them all; today it seems to be a case, as one gloomy observer put it, of each state for itself and to hell with the rest. Thus, West Bengal clamors for an additional hundred thousand tons of grains from federal reserves even if this means more starvation in neighboring Bihar; Andhra and Madras are fighting for a government steel plant though they know that New Delhi lacks the necessary financial resources; Andhra, a surplus area, is reluctant to send food to needy Kerala despite Namboodiripad's frantic appeals; Maharashtra, Mysore, and Andhra are engaged in a legalistic quarrel over the sharing of common river waters; and Kerala is insisting on its "right" to use foreign-exchange earnings from its spice exports (a federal responsibility under the constitution) to buy food from "friendly countries."

With political parties concentrating on regional grievances, there is a slow erosion of national ideologies. As one Bengali intellectual commented, the basic political currency in India today is not democracy, socialism, Communism, or even Hindu revivalism but provincialism shot through with linguistic and caste issues. But most politicians are not unhappy with this state of affairs. A Kerala Communist M.P. told me: "We cannot, of course, afford to forget national interests, but our primary duty should be towards our own people, the sons of Kerala. Perhaps, if we had a surplus of rice, we might have behaved just like the selfish Andhras are doing now. These are political compulsions which no amount of sermonizing from New Delhi can obscure." One theory being advocated in CPI Marxist circles is that India should be "liberated" state by state, since a national operation is not possible under prevailing conditions. One Communist leader reportedly told the Madurai conference that he saw no contradiction in the party's supporting every "people's movement" even if it involved the people of one state fighting those of another.

All the national parties represented in the Indian Parliament are organizationally split along regional lines. The Swatantra Party's so-called flexibility on the federal language issue is typical: while its adherents in Madras are fighting "Hindi imperialism," their counterparts in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan have jumped on the Hindi bandwagon. Some Hindi- and Tamil-speaking Congress Party M.P.s are not on speaking terms with each other. Mao Tse-tung's ill-fated formula "Let a hundred flowers bloom!" is the current passion among India's politicians. The one consolation is that they have taken to the experiment with a degree of honesty of which only those with sound democratic instincts are capable.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



How Wallace Will Run His Third-Party Campaign

RICHARD M. SCAMMON

TWO QUESTIONS dominate most speculation about Alabama's ex-Governor George Wallace and the 1968 elections: "Will he run?" and "Which party will he hurt more?" To the first, Wallace himself answers "Maybe" and to the second, "Both." But the best evidence today is that he *will* run in 1968 and that he will hurt the Republicans somewhat more than the Democrats.

There is less indication of just how he will put his campaign in motion. His good showing in 1964 in the Democratic Presidential primaries in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland may well tempt him to try that road again. It would do most to keep him in the public eye, but it is risky. A vigorous Republican contest in Wisconsin, for example, might hold conservative attention and deprive Wallace of the crossover support he got there last time.

It also seems probable that Wallace has not yet decided upon a Vice-Presidential running mate or on how his supporters should work for his interests in the major-party national conventions. But these decisions can wait. As one of the most skilled political practitioners in America today, Wallace is well aware of the importance of good timing. Meanwhile, he seems content to do a limited amount of public speaking and a good deal of "meeting the people."

As his 1968 campaign develops, Wallace will have certain obstacles to surmount. Among other things, he will have to adapt to electoral laws that are based primarily on a two-party system. Ballot position, watcher arrangements, representation on local election boards—all these are essentially two-party operations. If he follows the examples of the substantial third-party effort of Senator Robert La Follette in 1924 and the 1948 efforts of Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond, Wallace will find it necessary to adopt different tactics in different states. In some places he would probably run as an independent, in others as a States' Righter, a Conservative, or a Constitutionalist. In Alabama, he might be the official Democratic Party candidate, forcing the Johnson-Humphrey electors to run on an independent ticket or to forgo representation on the Alabama ballot, as Mr. Johnson did in 1964.

While much has been made of the difficulty of getting on the ballot in all fifty states, this problem would be less troublesome to Wallace than it appears. Only the "miniparties" (Prohibition, Socialist Labor, and the like) have real problems here. While California and Ohio could be troublesome, in most states putting a candidate's name on the ballot is not too hard for a group with any real measure of popular support—and an organization to express that support. The very process of getting on the ballot can be a useful exercise in political propaganda, involving new Wallace supporters and workers in a new and "democratic" effort.

Common Ground

The basic pitch of Wallace's campaign is foreshadowed by his recent speeches. In Memphis in August, he made strong attacks on the "liberal press, me-tooism, intellectual morons, and the bureaucrats in Washington," joined with support for state responsibility, local self-government, and praise for the nation's police. While Wallace's appeal to Southern voters on these themes is obvious, it would be a mistake to regard him as simply another Strom Thurmond. Particularly in his stand against crime in the streets, Negro "excesses," public-welfare and foreign-aid "abuses," and those who "support the Vietcong," he is making a determined effort to win wide support outside the states of the old Confederacy.

California's solid vote in 1964 to ban open-housing legislation, New York City's 2-to-1 vote in 1966 against a civilian review board of police activity, and Toledo's recent rejection of open housing by a vote of 2.5 to 1 make it clear that many American voters have at least some views in common with George Wallace. Further confirmation of this affinity is revealed by a poll conducted by Louis Harris over the summer indicating that more than three out of five white Americans are quite prepared to see looters and arsonists shot down in the streets. Another poll conducted in August by George Gallup revealed that seventy-seven per cent of the voters have "great respect" for the police as opposed to only four per cent who have "hardly any." In the same poll, when asked if police brutality existed, eighty-one per cent said "No" and only six per cent "Yes"; the rest were uncertain. Still another recent national poll indicated that sixty-four per cent of the people felt that the police do not have enough authority to handle their job.

If there are major street disturbances during the summer of 1968, therefore, it might well be that the control and suppression of riots would become Wallace's major campaign issue. His views on the matter are unmistakable and are expressed

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with a vigor calculated to commend him to many who would otherwise find little time for a third-party candidate. Naturally, this appeal would depend on events themselves and on the response of the major-party candidates. But both Democratic and Republican nominees will be forced to seek the support of a very wide-ranging constituency, and neither could afford to take Wallace's militant approach. It would be difficult to imagine either major party ticket outflanking Wallace in militancy toward riots.

THOUGH PUTTING his views before the public will be costly, there is no reason to believe money will be a major obstacle to Wallace. Even if no wealthy rightists come forward to supply a good part of the needed funds, smaller donations might prove to be substantial. In fact, a dedicated minority is usually more willing to give time, effort, and money on behalf of its candidate than is the more complacent majority, and even "little people" will often contribute surprisingly large sums to a candidate who they feel will "Stand Up for America."

Certainly Wallace will want to travel as much as possible. Since he alone is his party, his personal appearances would be counted on to win votes, raise funds, enlist campaign workers, and get maximum press and TV coverage. It is, therefore, on the basis of the personal appearance—and everything that goes with it—that the major thrust of the Wallace campaign will doubtless develop. If a few challenges to debate can be thrown out, that will help too, whether they are accepted or not.

While the general pitch of a Wallace drive is predictable, its precise details depend not only on events but on the make-up of the Republican ticket. If the party selects a "liberal" candidate like George Romney or Nelson Rockefeller, Wallace no doubt would make a strong appeal to Republican conservatives, including hard-core Goldwater supporters. Yet public-opinion polls seem to indicate that the G.O.P. "dropoff" to Wallace would only be slightly less with Richard Nixon as the party nominee. Possibly Governor Ronald Reagan is the only prospective nominee who could seriously dent Wallace's potential appeal to Goldwaterites.

Early in September both the Gallup and Harris polls published findings about the Wallace candidacy vis-à-vis his potential opponents. Against President Johnson and prospective Republican candidate George Romney, Wallace got ten per cent of the vote in the Gallup poll. In the Harris report Wallace had eleven per cent against Johnson and Nixon and thirteen per cent against Johnson and Romney.

In both polls, Wallace appeared to draw substantially more from people who would otherwise vote Republican than from those who would support President Johnson. To Gallup pollsters, "Wallace is clearly a greater threat to the Republicans than to the Democrats"; to Harris, "Wallace would likely take almost twice as many votes from the Republican nominee as he would from the President." In the judgment of Harris, ". . . Wallace as a third-party candidate would make President Johnson a favorite to win re-election."

Detailed breakdowns of Wallace's present support show his greatest

strength in the South, as might be expected, and among farmers and workers, confirming his appeal to the "little people." He himself frequently mentions his support by Southern labor, and many observers would regard his economic ideas as more Populist than "capitalist reactionary."

Certainly those who expect a Wallace program to involve massive cutbacks in "people spending" would be disappointed. In such areas as education and care for the elderly, Wallace speaks for an expanded rather than a smaller commitment of resources, though naturally he advocates that these be taken out of the control of "big-government Washington bureaucracy."

Electoral Arithmetic

While Wallace himself talks of winning the contest, of so splitting the total vote as to edge himself into the White House, few observers would consider that outcome as a serious possibility. The real measure of Wallace's importance—and it may turn out to be the most important facet of the election—will be the effect of his candidacy on the choice of Presidential electors in the individual states.

In 1948, Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond polled only somewhat over a million votes each. But in New York and Michigan, to cite two big states, the vote for Henry Wallace was greater than the margin by which Republican candidate Thomas E. Dewey was victorious. In California a few thousand more votes for Wallace, if taken from President Truman, would have given that state's twenty-five electoral votes to Dewey. As for Thurmond, his thirty-nine electoral votes came far closer to throwing the election into the House of Representatives than did La Follette's thirteen electoral votes a generation earlier.

With 1948 and 1924 in mind, how might George Wallace fare in terms of the Electoral College? First, he might carry certain states, most probably in the deep South, with enough Electoral College votes to deny either the Republican nominee or President Johnson the required clear majority of electoral votes (270 of 538). Naturally, this possibility would depend on a vote so close elsewhere that Wallace's limited success would be enough to require action in the House of Representatives. At this writing most public-opinion polls rate the race of 1968 a toss-up, with margins changing from poll to poll and from month to month. Unless the actual election produces a clear popular- and electoral-vote winner, a repetition of 1948 or 1960 might end up in the House of Representatives in 1968 even if Wallace carries only a few Southern states.

Quite possibly of greater importance, however, will be the effect of the Wallace vote outside the South

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in areas where he would have little chance of winning Electoral College votes. Any close state could be thrown one way or another in 1968 if Wallace did well there. For example, a state that would otherwise come up with a popular vote of 52-48 per cent for a Republican over President Johnson would be turned Democratic if Wallace polled fifteen per cent of the vote and drew two-thirds of his strength from the Republican candidate. An examination of the 1960 election returns shows no less than eighteen states, with 234 electoral votes, in which the parties were at the 52-48 per cent figure or closer—in many, much closer.

IT CAN BE ARGUED that the evidence is still sketchy and has been garnered a year before the event. It can also be argued that there is no guarantee that the actual election will see Wallace drawing off Republican voters in the ratio presently suggested by the public-opinion polls. Indeed, if rioting becomes a major issue working for Wallace in 1968, it is not unlikely that additional support from white voters in the North would accrue to Wallace from large groups that normally vote Democratic. Finally, it can be argued that the nature of our political system is such that the voter finally tends to make his choice between the two major-party candidates. Certainly the followers of La Follette expected more votes than the less than five million they actually got, and the summer hopes of Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond were much brighter than the November realities.

But if the polls are even half right, no political realist can ignore what may become the most important single factor in next year's Presidential campaign—the candidacy of George Wallace. Though the riots during the long, hot summer of 1967 do not appear to have increased the reach of his appeal, widespread rioting in the Presidential summer of 1968 might extend it to a larger segment of a frightened white majority. In any event, his presence in the 1968 campaign will be of major importance to both the manner of its conduct and to the arithmetic of its result.

VIEWS & REVIEWS



Eucalyptus Trees

JOHN McPHEE

LAWNS were prickly with frost. Allan Gibbons ordinarily was careful to turn corners on the sidewalk as he walked to the station, but this morning, at each of the corners he rounded, he crunched a foot into stiff blades of grass, leaving prints. The 7:52 was on time. Gibbons found a seat by the window. It meant a lot to him to be able to ride on the 7:52. He couldn't actually feel grateful, but he was at least thankful that an arrangement had been made.

Until fairly recently, he had ridden an earlier train, the 7:19, which arrived at Pennsylvania Station just after eight. His office did not open until 8:50, however, and only the office manager had a key; so, after riding two stops on the Seventh Avenue subway and making the short walk to the building in which he worked, Gibbons had spent half an hour each morning waiting in a coffee shop.

ACTUALLY, when he had first gone to work, he had taken the 7:52 without thinking much about it, since the 7:52 was the most reasonable choice; but he had only been with the company nine days when John Freitag, the assistant vice president in charge of Gibbons's group, called him in. Unlike Gibbons, Freitag sat in an office of his own. The walls were only glass-topped partitions, though, and since the matter was somewhat personal, Freitag, who had a face that was kind and accommodating, had spoken in confidential, friendly tones.

Freitag said, "Mizener reports that you have been coming in late every morning."

"Yes, sir, a little, I guess," Gibbons answered.

"More than a little, I think," Freitag said, with a kind smile. He raised a paper on his desk. "Last Thursday, it was 9:10. Friday, 9:08. Monday, 9:09. Yesterday, 9:04, and today, 9:07."

Gibbons blushed. Freitag put the paper down and opened his hands, palms up. "To you and me, five or ten minutes doesn't seem like much, but this company has thirty-six thousand employees around the world, and thirty-six thousand times ten minutes can represent real money."

"Yes, of course."

"On the office level," Freitag went on, "there's the matter of interpersonal relationships. Some of these men have not been late in the past ten years. The record shows it. A few of them might resent a new man with all the special advantages of your education coming in here late every day. On the management level, the company picks new men very carefully, and we felt certain we had made a good choice when we got you. I'm sure it's just a misunderstanding and I know you'll

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clear up the trouble right away."

Gibbons explained why it seemed more sensible to take the later train.

Freitag said, "We each have our personal problems about transportation, but the company doesn't tell us where to live, and we can't ask the company to pay for our extra convenience. I'm afraid that's how it is."

FOR THREE YEARS after that interview, Gibbons had ridden the 7:19. Some of his colleagues, from time to time, asked him why he didn't move to a town on another railroad, and Gibbons usually answered that he intended to, but he didn't say so with much conviction, since he was fond of his home and of his community, where he had been born. Eventually, when people had begun to say of Gibbons that he was "quite well liked in the company," Freitag softened and put the matter of Gibbons's transportation before K. K. Sellner, the vice president in charge of Industrial Development, the department in which both Gibbons and Freitag worked.

Sellner called Gibbons into his office, which was a large square room in the southwest corner of the building, with a view of the Hudson that, in winter, sometimes included sunsets. Leather-covered chairs were arranged in a semicircle, facing the large table that Sellner used as a desk. He had a telephone attachment that enabled him to make and receive calls without handling the phone, a panel of buttons to summon people from all parts of the department, and, under an arm of his chair, a silent switch that opened and shut the door by radio control.

When Gibbons entered, he saw that Freitag had preceded him and was sitting in one of the leather chairs, smiling. Sellner waved Gibbons in. The door shut behind him, and Sellner told him to take a seat.

"Allan, I want to come to an understanding with you that I think you'll like," said Sellner, whose pleasant demeanor had always impressed Gibbons. "John here has told me all about your problem. We like to run a happy shop, so this is what we'll do. John says you have to be ten minutes late if you come on the second train. All right, from now on I want you to take the second train, but you'll have to agree, for fairness' sake, to stay until 5:10 every afternoon. How does that sound?"

"I would like that very much," Gibbons said.

"Thought you would," Sellner said. "John, I want you to spread the word to the others that we've made a special exception for Allan and that he'll be on his honor to stay later in the afternoon to make up for it. Glad we could do this for you, young man," he finished, rising to shake Allan's hand. Freitag grinned widely, relieved that everything had worked out so well. The official position that company policy had forced him to take had seemed a little unreasonable to him, in this particular case. The door popped open, and Freitag stood aside politely so that Gibbons could walk out first.

THE LATER TRAIN was less crowded, the cars were newer, and there were only two stops before the city. Gibbons was so pleased with the change that by now, less than a year after it had been effected, he had all but forgotten his long annoyance with the company for making him take the early one. Settling down by the window, he folded his *Times* longitudinally. The train picked up speed, moving through farmland that had been whitened by the frost.

He reached the office at 9:11, somewhat later than usual because the elevator had stopped at nearly every floor. Getting off at the sixteenth floor, he walked through the partitioned area that included Freitag's module, and reached the open area that contained his and seven other desks. As Gibbons appeared, George Mizener, the office manager, took a small notebook from his center drawer and noted the time. Despite the special arrangement, Gibbons was technically late, and Mizener had to go through the motions of his duty. Mizener was a reasonable man. If someone came in as late as three minutes after nine, he would pretend not to notice. To make his lenience less obvious on the record, he would often write that a man was three minutes late when in fact he had come in at 9:05 or 9:06.

"Slow elevator, George," Gibbons said to him. "How about a discount?" Mizener, in an unobtrusive way, was humiliated by his role as recorder of arrival times, not because he felt one way or another about the fundamental idea of this practice but because it set him apart from the seven generally younger men whose desks surrounded his own. The others were graduates of universities and, in most cases, of graduate business schools, and none of them would ever have been given such an assignment; most of them would have modules some day and, eventually, offices; but Mizener, as a graduate of a Brooklyn high school with no further credentials, was going to stay at the same desk and hold the same job for as long as he remained with the company. He smiled at Gibbons's remark but did not respond. Gibbons hung up his coat, nodded to the others, and sat down at his desk. He looked through his IN box. There was the usual fresh material on Project 61, mainly from São Paulo but also from London. Sifting through it, he found a memo he had been waiting for since early summer. His request for transfer to London had been reviewed by Personnel and he was instructed to make an arrangement through his section leader to discuss the results with K. K. Sellner. It was Gibbons's plan to rent his house and spend two years in London, after which he hoped to return with a refreshed outlook gained from practical experience in the field. He went into Freitag's office and learned that the vice president would see him at 3:00.

GIBBONS went back to Project 61 with buoyance. There was a reply from the London office to a letter he had written about a mill at Chaima in Portugal. It was, as Gibbons had thought, set up to make kraft papers exclusively from eucalyptus, a process similar to one that the company wanted to initiate in Brazil. The owner of the Portuguese mill would be pleased to have an observer spend a month with him early in the coming year. Someone would go down there from the London office, and Gibbons allowed himself to hope that he might be the man. He had always worked with nothing more than descriptions and figures. When the company consid-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ered a new project, a man from a field office traveled to the research site and later filed a report to New York, and it was Gibbons's job to evaluate such reports in relation to other surveys and his own studies, presenting his conclusions in papers that K. K. Sellner could take to meetings of the Central Executive Committee.

Through his work on Project 61, Gibbons had learned that eucalyptus trees are slim and rubbery and that they groan with an extraordinary kind of orchestration in the wind. Rain, he had read, will change eucalyptus bark from an almost white, high buff to glistening cordovan brown. The trunks of eucalyptus trees lean at odd angles, making a confusion of the forest. He knew the best ways to harvest the trees, and he already had some knowledge of the special methods required to make them into paper. Even so, he had never seen a stand of eucalyptus. He hoped the top men agreed that the eucalyptus project would be the logical beginning of his duties in the overseas division.

Soon after noon, he began watching the clock. On Thursdays, he regularly played squash with Jack Haley. That would help the time pass. When the minute hand finally clicked from 12:29 to 12:30, Gibbons and his colleagues stood as one and wasted no motions getting to the elevator. McNeil, who was in his forties and had been passed over twice for the job now held by John Frietag, sometimes moved more slowly, but the younger men moved swiftly and often were on the street by 12:32.

EXPERTLY, Gibbons let one elevator go and got on the next one, a move that usually paid off in saved seconds—as much as half a minute sometimes—because the first elevator was frequently held and delayed by the 12:30 flood from the stenographic pool on the fifteenth floor. This time, Gibbons was out of the building before any of his colleagues. Adjusting his hat, he leaned into a cool wind and hurried north to Fifty-fourth Street and Fifth Avenue. He went into the University Club, and, in the elevator, he removed his tie, unbuttoned his shirt at the cuffs and down the front, untied his shoelaces, and loosened his belt. Haley, always considerate, was waiting in the locker room, bouncing a ball on his squash racquet, when Gibbons arrived. Gibbons opened his shirt, and taking it off, removed his coat and topcoat with it. He hung all three on a single hanger, kicked off his shoes, and was dressed for play in less than a minute. He played harder than usual and won lopsidedly. He rinsed himself in the shower, dried vigorously, and slipped back into his three-layered shell of garments.

"See you downstairs," he called to Haley, who was still in the shower. On the way to the elevator, he finished buttoning his shirt and removed the topcoat. He pressed for the elevator, began to tie his tie, and

finished the knot just as the car arrived. His shirt stuck to his skin. His body was still glowing with the warmth of exercise.

On squash-playing days, he never had time for more than soup and a sandwich. The soup was set before him, by arrangement, within moments of his arrival in the dining room. He began eating and had nearly finished his meal when Haley joined him. Haley ordered beef goulash with noodles. Haley had plenty of time. Gibbons's company had originally been a downtown firm, and it had moved to the midtown area only half a dozen years before. Haley's company had always been in the midtown area, and one of the incongruities arising from this history was that Haley had two hours, if he wished, in which to eat his lunch, while Gibbons was pressed for time. Gibbons left the club at 1:24.

In the hour and a half between one-thirty and three, he read a report from Brazil, going over and over the pages because he could absorb nothing. His breath, short after the squash game, had not relaxed again; his legs felt even weaker than they had felt when he walked off the court. Sellner called him in at 2:59.

"YOUR test scores are quite good," Sellner said. "You seem to have the right requirements. You did damn well on the French and Spanish tests, and Personnel technically approves your application. I thought it was an acceptable enough idea, too, Allan, or I would never have initialed your first memo."

Sellner's friendly, negative tone stiffened Gibbons. "You don't think so now?" Gibbons said.

"It's not what I think that matters, Allan. In an outfit as big as this, any one man's attitude is subject to revision from above. I want you to know I fought for you. Off the record, I don't think I really agree with their reasons for not wanting you to go."

"Whose reasons?"

"Oh—you know," said Sellner, pointing at the ceiling.

"What did they say?"

"It's nothing personal. Don't for a minute think that. It's just a matter of policy. If you were transferred, some people might get to thinking one division around here had been raiding another."

"But . . ."

"Oh, I know, it isn't raiding in your case. You asked for the job and you have the qualifications—Personnel had to give you technical approval—and I put my initials on it. But policy can't be swayed by individual cases. This type of transfer hasn't been made before, and we're anxious not to set a precedent for what could become a bad situation in the future—one department grabbing men from another—and maybe a morale problem, if too many people start thinking the grass is greener somewhere else."

"Surely you don't . . ."

"Don't misunderstand me," Sellner went on. "No one thought about you. I told them you're mature for your age—how old are you?"

"Thirty."

"I told them that, and also you're the father of three children, and so on. I really went to bat. But this discussion was highly theoretical. Mr. Cartmell suggested that in your case

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we could get around the problem by having you resign. Then you could apply for the London job as if you were coming in from the outside."

"I'd do that," Gibbons said quickly.

"But"—Sellner spread his palm toward Gibbons and seesawed his hand—"the others talked Cartmell out of it. You'd lose half the advantages a man has in being with this company—Seniority Benefits, Cumulative Merit Raises, Profit Sharing, and so forth and so on."

"I wouldn't mind that."

"You're young."

"I'd be ready to give them up if it meant getting the London job."

"That was only Mr. Cartmell's idea, Allan, old Mr. Cartmell. No one agreed with him. The others made a good point. They felt that anyone who quit, for no matter what reason, could be considered technically disloyal—maybe only on paper, but still technically disloyal. You don't want disloyalty on your record."

Gibbons stood up. "I don't care what's on my record," he said.

Sellner jumped up from his chair, walked over to him, and put a hand on his shoulder. "I know you're disappointed, son, but you won't feel this way always," he said. "I've had disappointments, too, in my time. On the whole, things come out pretty well here. It's a good group. As a matter of fact, let me tell you—and this, I think, is the finest thing that could be said about any company: every one of my friends works here."

WHEN Gibbons went out of Sellner's office, he thought that he might walk directly to the elevator, get on it, and never come back. He went to his desk and actually reached for his topcoat, but the others all looked up from their work. The impulse suddenly died in him, and he covered the gesture by putting his hand in one of the coat pockets and pretending to make a search for something he had lost. When the others left at 5:00, however, Gibbons, ignoring his long-standing pledge, put on his coat and went with them. Having a little more time than he had recently been accustomed to, he chose to walk down the long, dark interavenue blocks to the station, where he took a seat next to the window on the 5:33.

Damaged in Transit From Stage to Screen

RICHARD BIMONTE

BACK in the days of the early talkies, one of the big problems centered on how to translate wordy, static stage works into the action-oriented language of film. Thanks to the creative and imaginative use of the growing body of technical refinements available, that problem has since been dealt with and variously solved.

But, as often happens with advances in technology, new problems arise to replace the old. What with transistorized equipment, greater mobility, and more subtle and suggestive lens performance, movie crews these days range far and wide, sticking their noses into just about everything everywhere. They want to shoot it where it's happening, baby, and like it is—even if the camera wobbles and recorded dialogue is lost in a buzz of background noises.

This new looseness and sense of liberation sometimes lead to such a St. Vitus' dance of disjointed, ear-splitting effects that one can't help but wax nostalgic for some good old-fashioned sequences of straightforward talk and strong characterization uncluttered by mod attempts to gussie up the visual flow with baroque irrelevancies.

The occasion for this carping generalization is the release of two films, both derived from stage works of more than ordinary merit and both marred by an apparently insatiable need to be with it in terms of the latest in film techniques. The first and more successful of the two is *The Tiger Makes Out,* Murray Schisgal's own elaboration of *The Tiger,* his slender but winning one-acter that brightened the off-Broadway scene a few seasons back. The second is *Shoot Loud, Louder . . . I Don't Understand,* an unwieldy and unfortunately disfigured version of Eduardo De Filippo's fine and eminently actable play *Le Voci di Dentro* ("Voices from Within").

Early in the Schisgal film its Sad Sack hero, sitting in a bus, mutters sexual imprecations at a pair of miniskirted young things down the aisle. He so unnerves a middle-aged woman sitting in front of him that she tears off her false eyelashes and surreptitiously reaches into her dress to let the air out of her breastworks. The gag is not as successful as it should be because the bosom, to begin with, is too incredible—at least several inches too incredible. This typifies the film's main shortcoming. It is always stretching a bit too far, puffing up the proceedings with a variety of overdone or overextended sight gags and frenetic switches in situation and locale, as if a self-conscious effort were continually under way to keep the basic concept out of that basement storeroom-apartment in which the entire action of the original one-acter takes place.

THOUGH some of the conceits appended in order to pad out the smaller proportions of the basic story line are both pertinent to the author's theme and impertinently delightful to watch for their own sake, perhaps the film's most successful sequence occurs when after half an hour's hopping around we settle down for a while in that basement setting and listen in on a great deal of funny conversation, conducted with immense comic gusto by Eli Wallach as a grubby intellectual loser who fancies himself a tiger and Anne Jackson as the unlikely prey he drags into his lair. They make an engagingly intense duo who would rather lecture each other than eat.

Here is the stuff of more substantial comedy: he an autodidact and nebbish, battling against dehumanization a dozen times daily and just as frequently defeated in his ineffectual tilting with such windmills as absentee landlords, college entrance exams, rush hours, civil-service employees, and a catch-as-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

catch-can sex life; and she a steamroller of a suburban matron who resolves to complete the baccalaureate she interrupted for marriage and motherhood, unmoved all the while by her husband's litany of deprivations, such as having to blow his nose with toilet paper.

All in all, the film is peopled by a gallery of ingratiating nuts and misfits. Among the more memorable are Rae Allen as a sexually hung-up divorcée who unloads a husband in order to complete her master's degree in sociology; Sudie Bond as a city housing interviewer who remains an exemplary stickler for procedure even as she is being shoved out a window by our irate tenant-hero; and Bob Dishy as a harried husband absentmindedly and crabbily negotiating terms for a wife-swapping deal with a carpool associate.

Some bits are reminiscent of Schisgal's equally amusing *Luv,* but while he may not have many strings to his bow, the arrows are always sharp. He has a great ear for urban intellectualese ("I've come to expect this from the disadvantaged," Sudie Bond says calmly as a cop tears the assailant's hands from her neck); and his wacky thumbnail treatises on alienation, mechanization, lack of communication, post-Freudian sex, and all the other hang-ups our time is heir to are well worth the listening. Perhaps that is why the film is at its best when it doesn't distract from dialogue and delivery.

EDUARDO DE FILIPPO is a Neapolitan actor-director-playwright whose enduring and well-deserved reputation in his own country has never quite managed to weather an Atlantic crossing. He is best known to audiences here through Vittorio De Sica: his famous play *Filumena Maturano,* which a decade earlier, under the title *The Best House in Naples,* had been subjected on Broadway to the disastrous Otto Preminger touch, provided the source for De Sica's highly popular film *Marriage Italian Style.* De Filippo is also to be credited with that hilarious opening episode of *Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,* in which a lusciously plebeian Sophia Loren, taking advantage of a traditional legal loophole, stays continually pregnant in order to avoid serving a jail term for black-marketeering.

The erroneous assumption hereabouts has been that De Filippo, a traditional clown whose work derives from the popular dialect theatre, is too Italian for effective importation. The truth is that since the appearance some twenty years ago of his comedy *Napoli Milionaria* (something of a stage counterpart to the then burgeoning Italian neorealistic film method), De Filippo has been a major observer and delineator of the human condition, rather than a sketch writer specializing in gabby, gesturing grotesques of the *vino*-and-*pasta* stereotype.

One would never guess it from the current *Shoot Loud,* but the play that served as its source is a highly effective theatrical piece, spare and simple in line of action, yet sly, subtle, and, at the last, moving in its pessimistic revelation of the murderous impulses that lurk unsuspected in the human heart. The hero, Alberto Saporito, lives with an aging eccentric uncle who, out of disgust for humanity, has long since given up talking. He limits his self-expression to spitting down from his balcony on people who pass by and to shooting off fireworks in varying rhythmic patterns that only his nephew can imperfectly translate. The plot has to do with an imagined murder that brings out the potential murderer in each of the innocent people implicated. When the supposed victim shows up after a protracted binge, everyone is relieved and assumes that things will go back to normal. But not an embittered Alberto. His dream, which first gave rise to the comic misunderstandings, finally serves to illumine the ugliness that surrounds him. There is a chilling second-act curtain when a fuse blows out and Alberto, trapped in the dark, fears that his neighbors intend to murder him by way of revenge. One of them, a kindly spinster, brings him some lighted candles, hoping thereby to draw suspicion away from her nephew. But her nephew has already confided to Alberto that he suspects all of his aunt's homemade soaps and candles have been manufactured, Nazi-style, from the fat of her victims. So Alberto sits, unable to move, in a darkened world where perception is possible only through the flickering horrors of Dachau and Auschwitz.

The comedy grows blacker and blacker as Alberto, betrayed by his own brother, begins to get an inkling of what his uncle's long years of silence meant to say. But his uncle has died during the excitement, and Alberto will never know what the

Talk to Me Now

Talk to me now,
Before the words have lost their meaning.
Words that will absolve what our look
Cannot say.
Put down the lie burning in the eye.

I cannot stand silence.
All faces are the same without the sound
Of half-spoken sentences.
I cannot bear silence, while we wait to say
Yes.
While we wait to go on,
I forget what I want to say.

Talk to me now.
We talk in sleep without an image,
Not dreaming,
Continuing the touch the waking can't complete.

—NORMAN JACKSON

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Support your convictions this Christmas... give The Reporter to your friends

Give your friends, relatives, and business associates *the* Christmas gift of solid, thought-provoking reading: THE REPORTER.

For any friend of yours should become a friend of ours. Any thoughtful person finds much in THE REPORTER to nourish his political *and* his artistic side—as this representative issue illustrates. And as a gift at Christmastime, THE REPORTER is superlative. In short...

1. [illegible]

2. THE REPORTER is easy to give, as [illegible] opposite your gift. (No standing in line, wrapping packages, etc.)

3. THE REPORTER keeps on arriving throughout the year ahead—a constant reminder of your thoughtfulness.

And the price tag on your thoughtful gift will be surprisingly low. Your *first* gift of a year's subscription—24 issues—costs $7. (If you wish, your own renewal order qualifies as a first "gift.") *Every gift after that costs just $5.* A good buy—by any standard.

Think about it now, won't you? Then use the postpaid form opposite. You need not pay until after the first of the year, if you prefer. The important thing, though, is to be *sure* your order reaches us in time to deliver THE REPORTER (and the gift card) by 25 December 1967.

The Reporter • 660 Madison Avenue • New York, N. Y. 10021

Regular rates: one year $7, 2 years $11, 3 years $14—plus $1 per year for foreign postage (50¢ for Canada and Pan American Union.)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

old man's shooting was all about.

The producers of the current film version, in which De Filippo unhappily participated, were evidently gripped by an urge to update the story and spice it up into another of those imitative *Italian Style* sagas which usually do well at the box office. What emerges is a hectic mishmash, largely because of the inclusion of a standard whore with a standard heart of gold who falls in standard love with a modish Alberto. As played by Marcello Mastroianni, he sculptures metal monstrosities and vacuously attributes his woes to his dreamy, sensitive artist's nature. It would be ungallant to balk at the presence of Raquel Welch, a magnificent example of current California architecture. However, both her role and the acting of it severely dislocate the story's values without adding any of their own. Not only does the plot finally choke itself with its own intricate web of largely irrelevant incidents, but the entire emotional key is lost as Marcello and his Raquel motorbike into the horizon of a supposedly happier tomorrow.

As if this soggy resolution weren't enough, one is also forced to submit to a typically barbarous dubbing by which the actors are robbed of their own voices and substitute spirits scream out a phony, often incomprehensible broken English. With such an echo chamber of horrors to compete against, even the few scenes that might register some richness of character interplay or rewarding human insight are blasted into predestined defeat.

NOTHING becomes old hat so fast as studied attempts to be modern. What's the point of being where the action is if, cinematically speaking, the action isn't structured into some kind of sense? Eduardo De Filippo has unquestioned dramatic gifts that transcend whatever the current fads may be. We can use more of his brand of hard-bitten humor, that strange melancholy mirth which freezes the face somewhere between a pained grimace and a bemused smile. It is a way of looking at the world that is at once Neapolitan and universal. Let's hope that his future Atlantic crossings will be less bumpy.

BOOKS

Loaded for Bear

SAREL EIMERL

WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM?, by Norman Mailer. *Putnam's. $4.95.*

" 'Face into the eye of the real, Hallelujah, he's a humdinger of a latent homosexual highly over-heterosexual with onanistic narcissistic and sodomistic overtones, a choir task force of libidinal cross-hybrided vectors.' "

Parody? Absolutely not. At least, I don't think so. Well, maybe the author is intending to suggest that psychoanalysts are sometimes given to an excessive dependence on jargon and categories, which is not exactly a new criticism. However, as presented, the words are those of D.J., an eighteen-year-old Texan and the principal character of this novel, offering his version of how his analyst talks about him to his mother, and the offering is typical of Norman Mailer's latest attempt to achieve a breakthrough in the writing of fiction.

We have for several years now been hearing a great deal about the need for such breakthroughs. As I understand the argument, they are considered essential if novelists are to provide meaningful commentaries on the present age. For these, it is often said, are tough times to describe. We have all been dehumanized or overstimulated, one or the other. Either way, our endocrine systems have gotten badly distorted, and the result has been a state of such confusion—psychological, cultural, political, economic, social, intellectual, physical, and emotional—that no novelist can begin to cope with the remains unless he abandons the traditional techniques and finds some form more suited to representing the chaos of the age.

I am skeptical about this reasoning on several counts. I doubt whether the degree of change that has taken place in the past few years is quite as exceptional as is often claimed. The great majority of human beings are both adaptable and emotionally limited, and I doubt whether external change, however radical, fundamentally alters basic feelings and attitudes. Even if it is true that change has been occurring so swiftly that all of us, whether aware of it or not, are blowing our gourds, I see absolutely no evidence to suggest that the breakthrough writers have come up with a more effective style for portraying the consequences than that of *Vanity Fair*.

There is, besides, the danger that a novelist who dedicates himself to achieving breakthroughs will end up churning out novelty for novelty's sake. This, I am afraid, has been the fate of Norman Mailer, who for the past twenty years has struggled with great determination and persistence to invent new forms for describing experience. He is obviously a man of outstanding industry, intelligence, perceptiveness, and talent. His literary skills are remarkable, most of all for their range and variety. He commands several different styles. With equal effectiveness he can write appropriate dialogue for a middle-aged Southern lady or a Northern slum child, chart the progress of a domestic squabble, or describe a forest covered with snow. But, by my count, he has written only one good novel, *The Naked and the Dead*, which appeared almost twenty years ago, and I suspect that the main reason for his failure since then lies in his absolute determination always to be doing something new, at whatever cost, including the cost of producing unsatisfactory books.

HIS LATEST NOVEL is exceptional as an exercise in novelty. The principal narrative is simple. Three Texans—D.J., his father, and a teen-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aged friend—go up to Alaska to hunt bear. They kill a few and return home. This story, like so much else in Mailer's life and work, shows that, despite all his determination to be an original, he is still playing the ape to Hemingway. If it isn't the boxing and the announced resolve to beat all other writers, it is the bits of Spanish and the bulls. And if it's not the bulls, it's "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber" revisited, right down to its physical courage that proves a man really is a man, and even to "Oh, my god, we've wounded the damn thing; have we got the guts to go on in and finish him?"

The principal difference is that Hemingway's story was straightforward and its point clear. In Mailer's version there is a portentousness which suggests that he is doing far more than describe the hunt and the emotions of the hunters. But what? He could be saying that his characters—or Texans in general, or Americans—perform such activities as hunting simply to establish their virility. He could be saying that his characters—or Texans or Americans—are too caught up with violence.

Then there is a long and very elaborate technical discussion of sporting guns and some description of helicopters used for hunting, which combine to suggest that Mailer is deploring the effects of modern technology. Alternatively, he might just be writing a bravura passage about guns and another one about helicopters. Or he could be commenting on the American firepower and its consequences in Vietnam.

There is one incident that seems peculiarly portentous. One of the bears is dying and D.J., looking into its eyes, suddenly feels an intense sympathy with it. At that moment, his father, whose main concern is to take back a bearskin to impress his business associates, hits the wretched beast with a last and completely unnecessary bullet. D.J. is sickened. What does it mean? Perhaps that the two will never get along because some incident will always occur to prevent it. Perhaps that an unbridgeable gap will always separate fathers and sons. Perhaps it is an allegory about the innocence of the young being corrupted by the cau-

You can dry his tears

ORLANDO MARTINEZ. SOUTH AMERICAN. AGE 3. One of five children. Father mason's helper. Earns $22.50 per month occasionally. Live in hut in squatter area. Tin roof. One room. One bed. One blanket. One trunk. Gasoline stove in room. No facilities. Only food corn soup, bread and native drink made of brown sugar and water. No milk ever. Need vitamins and better food. No toys. Plays with stones. Help to Orlando means help to entire family, medical care included.

Thousands of children as needy as Orlando anxiously await "adoption" by you or your group. Choose a boy or girl from Greece, South Korea, Viet Nam, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Colombia, Ecuador or Peru. Your child and his family receive a monthly cash grant, as well as counselling, medical care, blankets, household equipment, clothing—and primary school education. You receive a case history and photograph. Each month you write and receive a letter (original and translation). Learn how your "adoption" benefits the entire family. Soon, through the regular letters and progress reports, you and your child develop a warm, loving relationship.

CHECK YOUR CHARITY! We eagerly offer our financial statement upon request because we are so proud of the handling of our funds.

PLAN is a non-political, non-profit, non-sectarian, independent relief organization, approved by the United States Government, registered under No. VFA019 with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid of the Agency for International Development and filed with the National Better Business Bureau in New York City.

© Foster Parents Plan, Inc. 1967

Foster Parents Plan, Inc.

352 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10010 • Founded 1937

PARTIAL LIST OF SPONSORS AND FOSTER PARENTS

Steve Allen
Sen. Paul H. Douglas
Helen Hayes
Conrad N. Hilton
Sen. Jacob K. Javits
Sen. Robert F. Kennedy
Art Linkletter
Amb. & Mrs. Henry Cabot Lodge
Garry Moore
Sen. William Proxmire
Dr. Howard A. Rusk
Mr. & Mrs. Robert W. Sarnoff
Gov. & Mrs. William W. Scranton
Sen. John G. Tower

FOSTER PARENTS PLAN, INC. R-10-67
352 Park Avenue South, New York, N. Y. 10010
In Canada: P. O. Box 65, Sta. B. Montreal, Que.

A. I wish to become a Foster Parent of a needy child for one year or more. If possible, sex ..... age .....
nationality .....
I will pay $15 a month for one year or more ($180 per year).
Payment will be monthly ( ), quarterly ( ), semi-annually ( ), annually ( ).
I enclose herewith my first payment $.....

B. I cannot "adopt" a child but I would like to help a child by contributing $.....

Name .....

Address .....

City ..... **State** ..... **Zip** .....

Date ..... *Contributions are income tax deductible*

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tiousness or the stupidity or the selfishness or the stupid business ethics of their elders. And perhaps Mailer wrote in the incident just because he liked it.

IT WOULD BE EASY to go on debating and spinning theories about the various meanings that can be read into Mailer's account of the hunt, and equally easy to read significance into the choice of characters. Texans! And then there is the title. And the references to Dallas, and LBJ, and especially to George Hamilton, not himself a figure of much consequence. Presumably, then, Mailer must be making some comment on the role of Texans in our national life. Certainly it is obvious that this book would not have been written, at least in its present form, if Lyndon Johnson had not been President. But the references are just slipped in. Mailer makes no attempt to explain them, and my conclusion is that he was trying to score a few cheap and easy points against people he dislikes, but had not figured out just what the points were.

However, it is not the incidents, the descriptions of the characters, or the Alaskan countryside—though some of the latter is excellent—that constitute the most interesting element in this novel. It is the style:

"Tex, D.J.'s best friend, blood brother, incest is electric man, never forget, and eighteen between D.J. and Rusty it is all torn, all ties of properly sublimated parental-filial libido have been X-ed out man, die, love, die in a diode, cause love is dialectic, man, back and forth, hate and sweet, leer-love, spit-tickle, bite-lick, love is dialectic, and corporation is DC, direct current, die-hard charge, no dialectic man, just one-way street, they don't call it Washington D.C. for nothing, eighteen, it's all torn, torn by the inexorable hunt logic of the Brooks Range when D.J. was sixteen, wait and see."

This passage was not chosen at random. The book is packed so tightly with obscenities that it would not have been practicable to select a passage at random for quotation in a magazine. However, the passage is a fair example of the showy and overblown style which Mailer has chosen for his allegory on present-day America, if that is indeed what this novel is supposed to be. What is the purpose of such rolling masses of words, many of which do not have any meaning in its traditional sense? Presumably Mailer is trying to convey his sense of the confusion, the violence, the irrationality of contemporary American life. It is rot, stump, dwarf, dying, dying, rot, stump, dying, rotting, rotting, stinking, gangrene, rot, sick, smell, putrefaction, gangrene, chaos—all in a few lines of a by no means unusual paragraph and excluding obscenities. Mailer is aiming not at the minds of his audience but at their guts, and his technique is to repeat purely emotive words, over and over, until they become hypnotic.

DESPITE its self-conscious intellectual pretentiousness, this novel is blatantly anti-thought and anti-reason. This is shown most vividly in Mailer's use of obscenities. Perhaps he decided that by adopting the literary style of an illiterate G.I.—and exaggerating it, at that—he would be better able to portray the state of mind of a typical present-day teen-ager—or Texan, or American. Some reviewers have flattered this illusion by speaking with approval of the salutary shock that Mailer has just handed America. If they really believe this, they must be remarkably naïve, for Mailer being obscene is about as shocking or salutary as a slum child would



be, bawling out the same old, weary words. Mailer, it seems, is angry again. One supposes he thinks it is America that has provoked his anger, because it is such an unpleasant place today.

No doubt his conscious motive for writing out these wretchedly boring obscenities was to express his sense of outrage at the cult of violence in present-day America, the drive to "make it," the decline of grace or even ordinary good manners, and the depersonalization caused by the worship of facts and technology. If this is so, it seems only fair to point out that these are precisely the qualities that America might with full justification object to in Mailer's work. For in this book, as usual, he seems to be writing about himself. He reminds me of Swift, old, disappointed, and half crazy, scribbling his obscene verses about his adored Stella in the toilet.

Many people have remarked that Mailer deserves to be congratulated for his courage in exposing himself, as for his determination and persistence in experimenting with new literary forms. Possibly so. But the new forms have not amounted to much, and most of what he has exposed has not been particularly pleasant. Judging from his work, he is a bitterly frustrated man. His self-hatred has directed itself toward the outside world, and I do not think that this psychological situation constitutes a sound basis for the kind of work that Mailer has been doing these last few years.

IT SEEMS to me a great pity, for him and for us, that he is not making better use of his superb literary talents, and I would like to offer a few suggestions. Coming from so soured a source, his criticisms of the world are of very little value. I therefore do not think he will achieve much by continuing to write in a highly subjective manner and trying to pass off the result as journalism or social comment. If Mailer is resolved to keep writing about himself, then he might do well to give up aping his god Hemingway, who really does not justify such faithful adoration, take Rousseau as his model, and give us his confessions, proclaimed as such. He might do very much better to get his mind off himself for at least one book, make more use of his skill as an observer, go back to the kind of style he used in *The Naked and the Dead* or *The Man Who Studied Yoga*, and try an old-fashioned realistic novel. That would at least have the advantage of submitting his talents to a much-needed disciplining. But whatever he does, I think he ought finally to take the pledge to stop using all those words his mother would have disapproved of. We all know he knows them.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rhodesia's Case

ERNEST W. LEFEVER

CRISIS OVER RHODESIA: A SKEPTICAL VIEW, by Charles Burton Marshall. *Johns Hopkins Press. Paperback, $1.45.*

Winston Churchill once said that "facts are better than dreams." In his "skeptical view" of the situation in Rhodesia, Britain's only remaining crown territory in Africa, Professor Marshall calls for the recognition of certain relevant facts all but lost in the strangely unreal debate leading to the December 16, 1966, Security Council resolution that declared Rhodesia a "threat to international peace" and imposed selective mandatory economic sanctions.

This unprecedented Security Council action, vigorously supported by Washington, is a well-known current fact, along with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Salisbury government on November 11, 1965.

A less familiar but crucial fact is the unique political and legal status of Rhodesia (formerly Southern Rhodesia), which Mr. Marshall eloquently documents. Unlike India, Nigeria, or even Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Rhodesia was never a colony administered by the British government. It was established by a private company led by Cecil John Rhodes and was governed by the company until 1923, after the settlers voted an "autonomous government in association with the Crown" rather than incorporation into South Africa. Thereupon London appointed a governor with formal executive functions, but with no real authority in internal affairs and limited authority in external affairs.

SINCE 1923 the Rhodesians have had their own citizenship, issued their own passports, and negotiated their foreign trade pacts. They have received and appointed consular representatives. The only British officials to serve in the territory were the governor (until 1959 when he was replaced by a Rhodesian) and diplomats. Britain never governed Rhodesia nor was ever called on to defend it. Rhodesia has its own armed forces and a large number of Rhodesian volunteers fought with Britain in two world wars.

If Prime Minister Wilson is prepared to withdraw the substance of British power east of Suez, he should be prepared to relinquish the fragile symbol of British authority south of the Zambezi. But because of domestic and Commonwealth political pressures, he is opposed to Rhodesian independence unaccompanied by arrangements for speedily imposing a universal franchise. Washington's support of the sanctions resolution, designed to modify or overthrow the government of Ian Smith, is motivated by similar considerations.

While moderately effective economically, the U.N. sanctions have had an opposite and unintended political effect in Rhodesia—and for that matter in Zambia. The Smith régime has been strengthened and nudged toward the Right. It is not clear how long the "Smith moderates," as they are called in Salisbury, can hold their own against right-wingers who seem intent upon restricting even the present limited franchise, which extends to citizens of all races who meet minimum age, literacy, and income qualifications—provisions that effectively disenfranchise the great majority of black Rhodesians.

The internal problems of state-building aside, Mr. Marshall argues that external sanctions designed to effect internal political reform are beyond the proper competence of international politics. He insists upon *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, to use the title of his first book (1954). The state is antecedent to international politics. By its very nature it is endowed with certain prerogatives, rights, and responsibilities. Assuming Rhodesia to be a state, a proposition difficult to deny by any common-sense definition, the government in Salisbury is responsible for internal affairs and is enjoined from interfering in the internal affairs of other states.

By the same token, London (or Washington, or Moscow) has no mandate to interfere in Rhodesian affairs that have been the exclusive responsibility of Salisbury since 1923, even though it is under pressure to take a conspicuous position against the limited franchise. Marshall argues that Britain has no clear legal right (with or without Security Council Support) to withhold a certificate of independence until certain internal political changes are made in Rhodesia. Mandatory U.N. sanctions, in his view, create a disquieting precedent for meddling in the affairs of other countries.

Incidentally, it is difficult to demonstrate that the abrupt granting of the vote to tribal and illiterate peoples, with only a marginal participation in the money economy, is the best or only way to build a national society based upon consent and dedicated to inalienable rights of all persons. Elsewhere in Africa, the instant franchise has not always led to stability or democratic government. Perhaps there is a better way? After all, we Americans took well over a century to universalize the ballot, starting with a tiny, white, educated, male, propertied elite. And eighteenth-century America was not confronted with the immense problems of transforming a fragmented tribal culture into a unified democratic society.

It is argued that the sanctions were voted because Rhodesia is a threat to the peace. Marshall is not convinced. Can anyone seriously charge that Rhodesia is threatening the integrity of any of its neighbors by aggressive or subversive behavior outside its borders? If there is a threat of international violence, it is not from Salisbury but from the self-styled "freedom fighters" who are illegally crossing Rhodesia's border for the express purpose of overthrowing the government by subversion and military force.

MR. MARSHALL is not prescriptive. He offers no specific "answer" to the Rhodesian question. He urges no voting scheme upon Salisbury. But he does challenge some of the premises, perhaps illusions, underlying U.S. and British policy, not only toward Rhodesia but toward the Third World generally. It is Mr. Marshall's wisdom and perspective, imaginatively applied to a specific current issue, that give this book its larger significance.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Unclear objectives." "Over-reliance on bombing." "A misunderstood war." It was seventeen years ago...

Now, the man who took command in 1950, when we were on the verge of disaster in Korea, tells his own story of that war. Of how we met the challenge. Of how all-out Asian war was averted. Of why MacArthur was dismissed. And, perhaps most importantly, of why *today's* war objectives must be limited. *Publishers' Weekly* calls it "remarkably lucid and uncluttered with military jargon . . . A highly interesting and important book." "It says most of the things that needed to be said," writes General S. L. A. Marshall, "and most soldiers (and other people) will be thankful for it."

THE KOREAN WAR

Matthew B. Ridgway

General, United States Army, Retired

U.S. Army

$6.95 at all booksellers

DOUBLEDAY

THE MIDDLE-CLASS NEGRO IN THE WHITE MAN'S WORLD

Eli Ginzberg and Associates

What do middle-class Negro youths see as their future? How do they expect they will be treated? How do they feel about the Civil Rights movement? About marriage and children? About their role in the community?

Based on interviews (by Negro interviewers) with high school seniors and college students living in Atlanta and New York, this study answers these questions and many more. $5.00

THE NEGRO POTENTIAL

Eli Ginzberg. "An outstanding analysis."
—R. C. WEAVER, *American Sociological Review* $1.45 paper

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

440 West 110th St., New York, N.Y. 10025



Leemanship

ROGER D. MASTERS

THE MAYOR'S GAME, by Allan R. Talbot. *Harper & Row. $6.95.*

This year has seen a bumper crop of books about New Haven. Besides several novels set in the city, a children's book on Mayor Richard C. Lee, and Reuben Holden's pictorial history of Yale, we have had William Lee Miller's *The Fifteenth Ward and the Great Society.* Now, complementing Miller's picture of politics at the neighborhood level, Allan R. Talbot focuses on City Hall's leadership in what, the racial outbreaks of last August notwithstanding, has been one of the most progressive cities in the country.

Talbot hides neither Lee's devious strategic maneuvers nor his problems and failures. The sharp battles within his administration (particularly between the mayor and his first Development Administrator, Edward J. Logue, who has since moved on to Boston); the techniques of lining up support from the business community and the local press (frequently robbing the opposition of its potential leaders); the use of personal ties with Yale's late President A. Whitney Griswold to bail out a program or outwit its critics; the near collapse of a major downtown renewal project and the uproar over a plan to achieve school integration by bussing; Democratic Party infighting—it's all here.

Mayor Lee is easy to portray as an aggressive and effective leader devoted to reversing the trend of urban decay; Talbot also shows us a politician who carefully times two-minute "wake stops" at funerals, an administrator who increases his own control by encouraging competition among subordinates, and a man who enjoys razzing an over-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weight policeman ("Damn it . . . , if you get any fatter I'll have to make this a one-way street").

Lee emerges from Talbot's portrait as a catalyst, fusing the legal and technical know-how of sophisticated planners with a party machine run by professional politicians. He also appears as a skilled planner and politician in his own right, equally a master of the intricacies of ward politics and the details of Federal housing programs. Blessed by this rare combination, New Haven's urban-renewal and anti-poverty programs have seemed far ahead of most American cities'.

Even when violence broke out, Lee was not unprepared. Although he described last August as "the most agonizing experience in my fourteen years as mayor—indeed, the most agonizing experience of my life," his administration brought the situation under control without any deaths, and in fact without the police firing a shot.

New Haven has enjoyed special advantages that antedate the Lee administration and are shared by few other cities. As early as 1941, a master plan for urban development had been prepared for the city by Maurice Rotival, a French planner. By the time Lee first took office in 1953, planning and construction of the superhighways called for by Rotival had begun, the city had a redevelopment agency, and preliminary Federal grants had been received for a renewal project in the Oak Street area.

Thanks to Lee's own aggressive planning, the city ranks first in the United States in Federal urban-renewal grants per capita, having received $850 per person (as compared to $143 per person in San Francisco and $46.60 per person in Chicago). If New York had received renewal funds at the same rate as New Haven, the Federal cost would amount to more than $6.5 billion—in contrast to its actual grants of $211 million.

Although Talbot describes clearly how New Haven received over $113 million in Federal money "with no local outlay of cash," he does not indicate what would be required for other cities to profit equally from such an astute use of state, national,

New, from OXFORD

Alcohol Problems

A REPORT TO THE NATION BY THE COOPERATIVE COMMISSION ON THE STUDY OF ALCOHOLISM

Prepared by THOMAS F. A. PLAUT. "A valuable study that may very well lead to new legislation and provoke social changes, this book — the basic policy statement of the Cooperative Commission on the Study of Alcoholism . . . calls for a major shift in social attitudes about alcohol and problem drinking and for formulation of a national public policy on alcohol."
— *Publishers' Weekly* $4.75

The Impact of the Russian Revolution

THE INFLUENCE OF BOLSHEVISM ON THE WORLD OUTSIDE RUSSIA

Compiled by The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Arnold J. Toynbee, Neil McInnes, Hugh Seton-Watson, Peter Wiles and Richard Lowenthal investigate various aspects of the Russian Revolution in what is the first real systematic examination of how the revolution's programs and policies have influenced thought and action outside Russia. $7.50

Charlotte Brontë

THE EVOLUTION OF GENIUS

By WINIFRED GÉRIN. "[A] painstaking biography. British Scholar Winifred Gérin has already written biographies of Anne Brontë and ne'er-do-well brother Branwell. . . . If the result is not the vivid portrait that Victorian Novelist Elizabeth Gaskell wrote right after Charlotte's death, it is more complete and accurate — an exhaustive source of Brontëana." — TIME Magazine
12 halftones. $12.50

F. Scott Fitzgerald

THE LAST LAOCOÖN

By ROBERT SKLAR. "The best critical discussion of this writer that I have seen. . . . Sklar is the first critic to offer a comprehensive analysis of Fitzgerald's development as a writer. He discusses everything — the novels, the volumes of collected short stories, the stories that have not been collected, the available manuscripts."
— GRANVILLE HICKS, *Saturday Review* $8.50

The Republican Party, 1854-1966

SECOND EDITION

By GEORGE H. MAYER. The first complete history of the Republican Party examines its major policies and beliefs, the Republican presidents, Congressional and party leaders, the conducting of campaigns, and the impact of social and economic forces on the party. The new edition includes additional material on the 1964 Presidential election and the 1966 Congressional election.
Cloth, $9.75. *A Galaxy Book,* GB 211, *paper,* $2.95

The Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins

FOURTH EDITION

Edited by W. H. GARDNER *and* N. H. MACKENZIE. The widely acclaimed Third Edition has now been supplanted by this new volume which includes the latest known versions of all extant poems and verse fragments. The text has been revised from a scrutiny of all the surviving autographs and contemporary transcripts — resulting in about a hundred interesting changes and several times as many minor corrections. *2 line illustrations.* $7.50

At all good bookstores

Oxford University Press / New York

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stump-Jumpers Beware!

Two new books from Beacon Press are deliberately intended to help you harpoon that particular breed of political cat which never passes a vacant stump (or any other forum) without jumping atop it and proclaiming chauvinistic verities to unwary passers-by.

CONTAINMENT AND REVOLUTION
edited by David Horowitz, points up the sharp contrast between what American spokesmen have *said* we're doing in other parts of the world, and what the evidence of the last 50 years indicates that we really *are* doing, through our interventions in the affairs of other nations. Isaac Deutscher . . . William Appleman Williams . . . John Bagguley . . . Henry H. Berger . . . Todd Gitlin . . . John Gittings . . . Richard Morrock . . . with an introduction by Bertrand Russell. By all means read it before you stand pat on any stump-jumper conclusions about Vietnam! **Only $5.95 at your bookstore.**

REALITY OR PREACHMENT
by John K. Forrest, is a mind-stretching, systematic guide to distinguishing between the oratorical pretensions and the logical realities of such favorite words from the stump-jumper's vocabulary as "freedom," "equality," "man," and many others. Well calculated to help you (and train you to) squeeze the hot air out of puffed-up, moralistic proclamations and reduce them to their real meanings and significance. **Also $5.95.**

May we suggest that you depart forthwith for the nearest good bookstore and arm yourself with both of these penetrating volumes — and then go out and harpoon yourself a stump-jumper (or two, or more)?

BEACON PRESS **BOSTON 02108**

Solution to

THE REPORTER

Puzzle #177

Acrostician—

SVETLANA STALINA

T	H	E	T	E	A	M	O	F	F	S	I	D	E	
	Y		V		E		R		T		R		W	
	H	E	R	E	N	N	U	I		R	E	A	V	E
N		B		N		P		E		O		G		N
O	V	A	L		D	O	W	N	A	N	D	O	U	T
N		L		I		W		D		G		O		B
E	N	L	A	R	G	E	D		T	W	E	N	T	Y
T				O		R		S		I				T
H	O	P	I	N	G		O	P	E	N	D	O	O	R
E		A		K		A		O		D		R		A
L	E	T	T	E	R	S	T	O	A		N	I	S	I
E		E		T		M		N		S		N		N
S	A	L	U	T		A	W	F	U	L	F	O	G	
S		L		L		S		U		O		C		
	T	A	K	E	T	H	E	L	O	W	R	O	A	D

and private funding. In any event, an attempt to imitate Mayor Lee's successes on a national scale could well be too expensive to be possible.

Moreover, the coalition of interests that has elected Democratic liberals is faced by internal division, and may be far more vulnerable in coming years than is generally thought. From this perspective, William Lee Miller's account of his own career as an alderman since 1963 is more useful. Miller represents a diversified neighborhood that includes eminent lawyers and Yale professors as well as working-class Irish and Italians. He has been caught in the local crossfire between these groups over school bussing and scattered-housing proposals. These tensions in the Fifteenth Ward may be representative of things to come. The city's Democrats now seem badly split, with a conservative faction threatening to gain ascendancy. And the latest renewal project—a major effort involving a new City Hall, state and Federal courts, a post office, library, and several banks—has met with unforeseen obstacles.

While Talbot, like Miller, praises the planning and skill of the Lee administration, his account of New Haven's success is clearly too euphoric. The fact is that our urban problems are getting worse, not better. Across the nation, with a continuing threat of black violence and white backlash, it looks as though the mayor's game will not be as much fun in the years ahead as it has been for Dick Lee in the years since 1953.

Hawk

Hooded
He claws the humped ridge
Of this man's hand,
Feeling tame flesh
Under the hook.
Without sight,
He knows the heat of fear
And wings thump-thump the air.
Hoodless
A tense unfeathered thing,
His flight prepares the ground
For loss.
Like a rain mark
On a sun-lit day.

—NORMAN JACKSON

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

General Motors is people making better products for people.

Jim Rennell is murder on motors. For your protection.

You would never dream of doing the things to your car that Jim Rennell does to his engines. Like running them wide open 29 hours straight on a dynamometer. Which is like driving your car up a mountain all day. Pulling a heavily loaded trailer.

It's only one of dozens of grueling tests skilled technicians, like Jim, throw at GM engines before they're approved for production. To make sure they'll take anything *you* can ever throw at them. It's another way we protect your investment in each Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick or Cadillac car.

Jim Rennell, Dynamometer Operator, General Motors Engineering Staff, Warren, Michigan.



GM

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When an Avis girl winks at you, she means business.

The Avis Winker Code



1 wink: She has a car ready and waiting.



2 winks: It's a compact.



3 winks: It's a convertible.

There you are. Standing in our competitor's line. And in a hurry.

If the Avis girl at the next counter winks at you, you're in business.

One wink means she can put you into a shiny new Plymouth inside of three minutes.

Two or three winks mean you can have a compact or a convertible.

(See Avis Winker Code at left.)

That is your signal to leave the line, come to the Avis counter and get a car without waiting. We will even accept No.1's credit card.

But if the Avis girl winks more than three times, please disregard the message.

It's strictly against company policy.

©AVIS RENT A CAR SYSTEM, INC., A WORLDWIDE SERVICE OF ITT.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED